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Preface 
his is the seventh annual report issued by the CEPS Macroeconomic 
Policy Group (MPG) since it was reconstituted at the start of 
economic and monetary union in 1999. Special reports on the 
Stability Pact and on enlargement were also published in 2004 and 2002, 
respectively. (A full list of MPG reports, dating back to 1983, is reproduced 
at the end of this book.) Unfortunately, our reports have become 
progressively more pessimistic in their outlook for the European economy. I 
therefore wish to emphasise here that this pessimism comes from a group 
whose members have for a long time supported the creation of EMU. 
However, we have now reluctantly come to the conclusion that a 
combination of difficult initial conditions, declining economic fortunes and, 
above all, wrong policy choices have brought the entire enterprise to a 
critical point.  
The rejection of the draft Constitutional Treaty by the French and Dutch 
people portends a period of stagnation and general uncertainty in European 
affairs that threatens to last some time. In these difficult times, it pays to be 
realistic and to look at the difficulties that lie ahead. We remain hopeful that 
in the end Europe will overcome its difficulties, but the prospect of failure 
can no longer be ruled out. This is the spirit that has informed our choice of a 
title for this year’s report. 
We wish to acknowledge the valuable contribution of Francesco Daveri in 
the annex on productivity. Dennis Görlich provided excellent research 
assistance. All remaining errors are ours. 
The work of the CEPS Macroeconomic Policy Group would not have been 
possible without the continuing support of our main sponsor, Deutsche Bank, 
London, and Tudor Investments. I wish to thank them once more for their 
material and financial contributions. 
 
Daniel Gros 
Director 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Policy Conclusions 
The Euroland economy continues to disappoint while policy-makers are 
unable to rely on the usual macroeconomic instruments to stimulate growth 
and employment. An ongoing tug-of-war between short-run and longer-term 
considerations has limited the extent to which both fiscal and monetary 
policy could be used to stabilise demand. In the end, macroeconomic policy 
has ended up in the worst of all worlds: long-term discipline has fallen by the 
wayside, but there has also been no short-term boost to demand. Moreover, 
serious intra-area divergences are starting to emerge that could put EMU in 
danger.  
Against this background, we have the following policy recommendations: 
1)  The ECB should downgrade its short-term concern about cyclical 
economic developments and pursue a monetary policy aimed at 
preserving the value of the euro in the long-term. 
2)  The core countries urgently need to return to fiscal discipline. They 
should do so in their own interest and to set an example that would allow 
them to exert pressure on potential soft currency countries to do the same. 
The common problem behind these recommendations is a tension between 
short-term objectives and long-term constraints. 
In the monetary field, the ECB has ignored the medium-term warning signals 
stemming from the acceleration in money and credit growth. In fact, it looks 
as if political pressures are inducing the ECB to focus on short-term growth 
considerations at the cost of neglecting long-term stability risks. 
In the fiscal field, the key disciplinary device, the Stability Pact, has already 
effectively been emasculated by politicians who, pressured by persistently 
weak growth, opt for ‘short-termism’. This is dangerous because at the same 
time fiscal policy is coming under intense long-term pressure especially in 
those countries that have not been able to maintain price and cost discipline. 
The political difficulties that the entire EU must now confront after the 
French and Dutch referenda make it even more important to focus on the 
long-term goal of preserving price and financial stability in EMU. The 
neglect of the long term by national governments has clearly not paid off. 
The ECB needs to take action to preserve its credibility. iv | 7
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Executive Summary 
Previous reports of the CEPS Macroeconomic Policy Group have amply 
documented the structural causes for the lacklustre performance of the 
Euroland economy: the decline in productivity growth and the ageing of the 
population. In this report we document how structural weakness has impeded 
the effective use of the usual macroeconomic policy instruments. The 
comparison with the US undertaken in chapter 1 reveals a startling picture. In 
both the fiscal and the monetary fields, the US has been able to react much 
more strongly to the downturn that started after the stock market bust. For 
example, the cyclically adjusted deficit has moved between 2000 and 2004 
by five times more in the US than in the eurozone. Similarly, the variability 
(standard deviation) of the so-called monetary conditions index (which 
measures the joint impact of interest and exchange rates) has been five times 
higher in the US. 
There is a simple explanation for this huge difference in the degree to which 
macroeconomic policy was used to stabilise the economy: in the eurozone, 
longer-term constraints, even if often only reluctantly recognised, limited the 
freedom of movement in the short run. 
Fiscal policy was (and still is) torn between short-term cyclical expediency 
and the realisation that population ageing actually requires a balanced budget 
over the medium run in order to prevent debt levels from exploding (see 
chapter 1). Caught between Scylla and Charybdis, fiscal policy was kept just 
tight enough (at least in the large countries) to offset the impact of the 
economic cycle.  
Similarly, monetary policy was (and also still is) torn between a continued 
rapid growth of monetary aggregates and economic weakness (plus, until 
recently, a strengthening currency). In the end monetary policy was loosened 
just enough to keep monetary conditions from tightening while preventing 
money growth from accelerating too much. Again, this led to a policy setting 
that was barely responsive to the economic cycle.  
Unfortunately, the dithering extended to other policy fields as well. 
Structural reforms were undertaken half-heartedly as policy-makers 
succumbed to the fear of the near-term negative economic and political 
consequences, thus depriving Euroland of the benefits of higher growth and 
employment that would come in the long-term – i.e. now, if reforms had 
been undertaken when they were promised. The latest and perhaps best 
example of this is the rejection of the services directive, where the short-term 
political cycle prevailed over the long-term needs of the European economy.  
Thus, it is fair to conclude that the immobilisme of economic policies in the 
euro area is the result of ongoing conflicts between contradictory short-term 
and long-term objectives. It is a dogma of economics that policies can only EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | v 
 
achieve one objective at a time. European policy-makers tried to achieve too 
many things at the same time, and ended up with weak growth, a weak fiscal 
position and a minimalist reform effort.  
Why did the long-term constraints not apply in the US? The answer is simple: 
the US does not face the same longer-term constraints. In particular, US 
fiscal and monetary policy could count on a much more dynamic and flexible 
economy as many structural reforms had already been undertaken during the 
1980s. Moreover, the greater dynamism had allowed policy-makers to 
tighten both fiscal and monetary policy much more in the run-up to the 1999-
2000 boom. The key to the transatlantic difference in policy activism thus 
lies in the transatlantic difference in terms of productivity and potential 
output.  
We also show that that there are large systematic differences within the euro 
area, with the small countries performing on average much better than the 
large ones on almost every indicator (higher growth, lower deficits, etc.; see 
chapter 2 for details). This difference in performance suggests that better 
policies can make a large difference even if monetary policy is the same for 
everybody. 
Monetary policy has been on hold for over two years now. We show in 
chapter 3 that this masks to some extent a considerable variance in both the 
so-called monetary conditions index (which tightened due to the appreciation 
of the euro during most of the period under consideration) and in the 
intentions of the ECB, as signalled by its main publication. We show that 
pronouncements of the ECB tended to become systematically more hawkish 
whenever survey indicators, such as the Purchasing Manager Index (PMI), 
strengthened and vice versa. It is disconcerting to see that ‘ECB speak’ has 
systematically lagged behind this indicator. A longer-term consequence of 
focusing monetary policy on the short term has been that since 1999 money 
and credit have consistently grown by more than nominal GDP, and by much 
more than foreseen under the reference value of the ECB. So far, 
this ’monetary overhang’ does not seem to have had an impact on inflation 
and is unlikely to do so for a long time, given the weakness in European 
labour markets. We argue however that this is no reason for complacency. 
Loose monetary conditions can also manifest themselves in asset price 
inflation, notably in the housing market. When these bubbles burst, for 
example, when housing prices stop rising, this often leads to a prolonged 
period of economic weakness. The main long-term cost of an excessively 
loose monetary policy might thus be economic weakness rather than 
consumer price inflation. 
The risks for EMU are increasing not only because longer-term disequilibria 
become evident in fiscal and monetary policy, but also because serious 
divergences are now appearing within the euro area that threaten its long-vi | 7
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term cohesiveness (chapter 4). The most manifest example of this threat 
comes from what promises to be a long-term divergence between Germany 
and Italy. Since the inception of EMU, Italy has lost considerably on any 
measure of competitiveness, providing almost an exact mirror to Germany, 
which has gained in price and cost competitiveness, thereby enabling it to 
boost its intra-area market share. Until this year, the divergence did not 
become apparent in overall growth rates because of opposite developments in 
housing markets. However, once housing prices in Germany recover from 
the post-unification bust and Italy enters recession, the relative position of 
Italy is likely to deteriorate seriously. This is likely to lead to strong pressure 
on Italian government finances – and on government finances in other 
countries with a similarly deteriorated competitive position. With Italian 
public finances already now in a precarious state, it is easy to imagine the 
pressure that will be brought to bear on the ECB to keep interest rates low 
and to weaken the euro.  
The stage might then be set for a ‘lira-isation’ of the euro, but this is not an 
unavoidable outcome. The ‘euro-isation’ of Italy is also possible, and 
represents by far a more desirable scenario, but it will require painful 
adjustment efforts in Italy itself and a strong commitment by the ECB and by 
all the EU institutions in general to preserve the stability of the euro even in 
the face of seemingly irresistible short-term pressure to loosen up. 
 
 
 
 | 1 
Chapter 1 
Euroland vs. the US: 
A Tale of Two Economies & Two 
Approaches to Macroeconomic Policy 
2005 is likely to become the fifth consecutive year of disappointing growth 
for Euroland. Most current projections for 2005 hover around 1.5%, after 
only a marginally better result in 2004 and worse ones for the years 2001-
2003. This must be contrasted with the performance of the US economy 
whose growth has consistently remained above 3%, after a short recession 
2001. It is sometimes argued that this difference in performance is a result of 
different policies, with insufficiently expansionary macro policies being 
adopted in Euroland as compared to the US. This chapter looks briefly at this 
argument and shows that there is indeed a big transatlantic difference. But 
the difference does not lie in the average policy settings over the last half 
decade or so, but rather in their variability. The key difference is thus in 
policy activism. We will argue that different policy objectives and initial 
conditions can explain the differences in the way macroeconomic policy was 
conducted. 
1.1  Where is short-term macroeconomic policy in Euroland? 
Is domestic demand in Euroland depressed by overly tight monetary and 
fiscal policy? Over the last two years, real short-term interest rates have 
actually hovered around zero and are still slightly negative. Fiscal policy can 
also be characterised as expansionary if one looks at cyclically adjusted 
deficits. Economic policies are therefore accommodative. But should they 
have been even more accommodative? In fact, the most interesting 
characteristic about demand management in Euroland is its apparent absence. 
Both fiscal and monetary policies seem to be frozen, as if their stances were 
unrelated to the economic cycle. A comparison with the US shows a huge 
transatlantic gap in this respect. 
The transatlantic difference in the evolution of fiscal policy is illustrated in 
Figure 1.1 below. We have selected the cyclically adjusted deficit as the best 
indicator of fiscal policy as this already takes out the direct ‘automatic’ 
impact of the cycle on budgets. At the start of the economic and monetary 
union (EMU), Euroland governments were already in a weak position with a 
cyclically adjusted deficit of around 1.5% of GDP, which was then allowed 
to deteriorate rapidly to a value around 2.5% of GDP in 2002, with very little 2 | 7
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change over the last four years.
1 By contrast, the US started the period under 
consideration with a cyclically adjusted surplus of over 1% of GDP and was 
thus in a much better position to use fiscal policy actively to manage demand. 
Due to a combination of spending increases and tax cuts, the US policy on 
the budget balance swung rapidly into a deficit of now over 4% of GDP on a 
cyclically adjusted basis. And the overall swing between 1999 and 2004 was 
equivalent to over 5% of GDP, five times larger than that for Euroland.  
Figure 1.1 A comparison of fiscal policy in the eurozone and the US, 1999-
2005 
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Source: European Commission. 
A transatlantic comparison of monetary policy tells a similar story. Figure 
1.2 below shows the evolution of official central bank interest rates, again 
over the period 1999-2005 (1
st qtr). Here one can see more movement for 
Euroland, but it is again apparent that monetary policy has been much more 
active in the US. The Federal Reserve lowered rates by over 5.5% percentage 
points between 2000 and 2003, compared to ‘only’ 2.75% points for the ECB, 
which has not moved rates for the last two years. 
                                                        
1 As an aside, we note that this relative stability of cyclically adjusted balances 
masks a more substantial deterioration of the underlying trend since over the 
same period Euroland governments could reduce the cost of servicing public 
debt by almost a full percentage point of GDP as a result of lower interest rates.  
Given that public investment also fell slightly, this implies that public sector 
savings must have deteriorated by almost two percentage points of GDP. EMU AT RISK | 3 
 
Figure 1.2 Comparison of monetary policy in the eurozone and the US, 
1999-2005 
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Sources: ECB and Federal Reserve. 
A more analytical way to summarise the degree of activism of the two main 
macroeconomic policy levers is to compare their variability as measured by 
their standard deviations. This is done in Table 1.1 below, which also shows 
the average values for the two main policy instruments considered here. 
Table 1.1 Policy settings and policy activism compared (1999-2005) 
 Average  Standard  deviation 
 US  Eurozone  US  Eurozone 
Cyclically adjusted 
budget balances 
-1.96 -2.19  2.45  0.37 
Central bank interest 
rates 
3.16 2.97  2.02 0.96 
Source: Own calculations based on data from ECB, Federal Reserve, European 
Commission and OECD. 
The last two columns in Table 1.1 confirm the visual impression of a 
completely different level of policy activism. The standard deviation of 
cyclically adjusted deficits is six times higher in the US and the standard 
deviation of central bank interest rates is twice as high.  4 | 7
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Table 1.1 also documents a fact that is often overlooked: macroeconomic 
policy has actually been more expansionary in the eurozone if one looks at 
average policy settings since the start of EMU. Cyclically adjusted deficits 
have been somewhat below 2% of GDP in the US, compared to around 2.2% 
in the eurozone. In terms of monetary policy there is very little difference.
2 
(Nominal) central bank interest rates have also on average been somewhat 
higher in the US (at around 3.2%) than in the eurozone (around 3%), again 
on average over this period. As there was very little difference in inflation 
(less than 0.2% on average for the GDP deflator and less than 0.5% for the 
CPI), this implies that real rates have also, on average, not been too different.  
It is possible that the movements in the cyclically adjusted deficit of the US 
exaggerate the degree to which this policy instrument was used for 
stabilisation purposes, since part of the increased expenditure was a reaction 
to an exogenous shock (the September 2001 attacks) and part of the tax cuts 
were motivated by ideological considerations. However, it is clear that the 
fact that the outcome in both cases was convenient from the point of view of 
short-term demand management helped to ease concerns about their impact 
on the deficit. It is also the case that large revenues from capital gains might 
have somehow led to an overestimation of the cyclically adjusted surplus in 
the US. We will come back to this argument later. 
The measure of central bank activism used so far might not be appropriate 
because central banks control only short-term interest rates, but there are 
other variables that impinge on overall monetary conditions. In particular in 
recent years, when exchange rates have followed persistent trends, it is 
possible that a higher variability of interest rates was the result of the central 
bank trying to offset the impact of shocks to the exchange rate on domestic 
monetary conditions. However, the analysis of a standard monetary condition 
index (a weighted average of the interest rate and the exchange rate) shows 
an even larger difference between the US and the euro area, with monetary 
conditions in the US moving in the expected cyclical fashion compared with 
a very stable path for the euro area (see Figure 1.3 below). 
                                                        
2 We will document below that a similar picture emerges if one looks at another 
measure of the monetary policy stance, namely the expansion of the money 
supply.  EMU AT RISK | 5 
 
Figure 1.3. Comparison of monetary conditions in the eurozone and the US 
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
M
C
I
 
(
1
9
9
5
-
2
0
0
5
 
=
 
1
0
0
)
US MCI Eur MCI  
Source: Deutsche Bank. 
It is apparent that monetary conditions have been much more variable in the 
US than in the eurozone. The reason for this is that high US interest rates 
were accompanied by a strong dollar (and vice versa). The US MCI reached 
a peak in 2000-01 at over 120 and then fell continuously to around 80 in 
early 2004. By contrast, the eurozone MCI only fluctuated between 90 and 
100 over this entire period, with a slight tightening trend over the last years 
as an appreciating euro overrode the impact of low and stable interest rates.
3 
In terms of standard deviations the difference in the variability of the MCI is 
very large indeed: the standard deviation of the US MCI since 1999 was 
13.6%, six times larger than the 2.7% for the euro area. The difference in 
variability is thus much larger for the MCI than for the central bank interest 
rates. 
1.2  Why is macroeconomic policy frozen in Europe?  
The key to understanding the different patterns in the evolution of policy is 
the difference in objectives driving the two regions. In the US, fiscal and 
monetary policies were fully geared towards a pure stabilisation role: in a 
                                                        
3 It is also interesting to note that over this entire period the euro area MCI was 
always below its longer-term average. This implies that monetary conditions 
were much more accommodative during the tenure of the ECB than during the 
preceding period, which was under the informal leadership of the Bundesbank 
(the average MCI for the EMU period is 93.4, compared to 110 for the pre-EMU 
period of 1995-98). 6 | 7
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standard textbook fashion. After 2000, economic weakness was met with 
increases in expenditure and cuts in taxes and interest rates. Part of the swing 
in fiscal policy might have been due to other causes, but this does not change 
the fact that the primary objective of macroeconomic policy was to support 
aggregate demand to offset the negative wealth effect stemming from the 
burst of the stock market bubble.  
By contrast, in the euro area, longer-term considerations played a much more 
important role and conflicted with cyclical needs. Fiscal policy was torn 
between short-term cyclical indications and the desire to respect the 3% limit 
of the Maastricht criteria – and the realisation that population ageing actually 
required a balanced budget or a small surplus over the medium run in order 
to prevent debt levels from exploding – a theme emphasised in our previous 
reports (see Gros et al., 2004b and 2003). Caught between Scylla and 
Charybdis, fiscal policy was kept just tight enough (at least in the large 
countries) to offset the impact of the economic cycle. It is no wonder then 
that the cyclically adjusted balance appears very stable: it was the implicit 
objective of policy.  
A similar mechanism was (and still is) operating on the monetary policy side: 
economic weakness and a strengthening currency was confronted with a 
continued rapid growth of monetary aggregates, and thus monetary policy 
was loosened just enough to keep monetary conditions from tightening while 
preventing money growth from accelerating too much. Again, this led to a 
policy setting that was barely responsive to the economic cycle.  
In a similar fashion, structural reforms were undertaken half-heartedly as 
fears of the near-term negative economic and political consequences 
confronted the benefits of higher growth and employment in the long-term. A 
clear example of this is the rejection of the services directive, where the 
short-term political cycle prevailed over the long-term needs of the European 
economy.  
Thus, it is fair to conclude that the immobilisme of economic policies in the 
euro area is the result of ongoing conflicts between contradictory short-term 
and long-term objectives. It is a dogma of economics that policies can only 
achieve one objective at the time. European policy-makers tried to achieve 
too many things at the same time, and ended up with weak growth, a weak 
fiscal position and a minimalist reform effort. A clearer allocation of 
objectives to the different policies would have perhaps led to a better 
outcome. 
The basic distribution of assignments between the three main elements of 
macroeconomic policy was clear as early as 2000: monetary policy could be 
relatively loose on the understanding that fiscal and structural policy would 
do their part to create the basis for sustained growth. Our first report already EMU AT RISK | 7 
 
insisted on this (see Gros et al., 1998). The onset of the downturn in late 
2000 only reinforced the rationale for this assignment: monetary policy 
constituted the most flexible policy instrument whereas structural policy had 
just given itself an ambitious longer-term objective in the form of the Lisbon 
agenda. Fiscal policy-makers had also continued to assert their adherence to 
the long-term goal enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact and had 
presented medium-term plans to achieve a balanced budget within a couple 
of years.  
Reality proved to be quite different. Neither structural policy nor fiscal 
policy delivered, whereas monetary policy remained rather accommodative, 
providing an environment of low interest rates in which national policy-
makers could have done their part, namely to implement structural reforms 
and bring fiscal policy under control.  
We argued last year
4 that Europe needed the carrot, not the stick. With the 
benefit of hindsight, Figure 1.3 suggests that the carrot was perhaps needed a 
couple of years before. 
1.3  Differences in policy activism and differences in supply 
side constraints 
The fact that longer-terms constraints impeded policy activism in Europe 
leads to the question why this was apparently not the case in the US. The 
answer is simple: the US did not face the same longer-term constraints. In 
particular US fiscal and monetary policy could count on a much more 
dynamic and flexible economy as many structural reforms had already been 
undertaken during the 1980s. The key to the transatlantic difference in policy 
activism thus lies in the transatlantic difference in the evolution of 
productivity and hence potential output. 
In terms of fiscal policy, the difference in constraints can be illustrated quite 
easily by looking at the steady-state debt/GDP ratio that results from 
different combinations of deficits and growth rates. Table 1.2 below (see also 
Gros et al., 2004b) shows that the growth differential between the US and 
Euroland has huge implications for the sustainability of fiscal policy.  
Table 1.2 shows that for a slow-growth economy such as Germany or Italy 
even a deficit of only 2% of GDP that persisted over the cycle would barely 
keep the debt-to-GDP ratio close to the 60% limit. Continuing deficits of 4% 
of GDP by all member countries would bring the EU debt ratio to over 100% 
of GDP. The contrast between Germany and the US is particularly striking. 
The latter could indefinitely run deficits almost twice as high (4% of GDP) 
                                                        
4 See Gros et al. (2004b). 8 | 7
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and still end up with a similar debt ratio (70% of GDP). Moreover, one has to 
keep in mind that the ageing problem is much less pronounced in the US than 
in European countries. The long-term solvency constraint is thus much less 
immediate for the US than for a slow-growth Euroland. 
Table 1.2 Steady-state debt levels (as % of GDP) 
  
     
Cyclically adjusted deficit as % of GDP 
        2% 3% 4% 5% 
Germany: 1.5%  57  86  114  143 
EU today: 1.75%  53  80  107  133 
Maastricht: 3%  40  60  80 100 
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US  today:  3.75%  35 52 70 88 
Source: Own calculations. The calculations assume an inflation rate of 2% so that 
nominal GDP growth is 2 percentage points higher than the real rates 
indicated in the first column. 
Slower growth thus implies a much tighter long-term constraint on fiscal 
policy. It is important to keep in mind that the long-term solvency of fiscal 
policy is determined by overall growth, not growth on a per capita or hourly 
basis. This is one of the many ways in which the long-term demographic 
decline of Europe is already exerting its negative effects today. 
The difference in the conduct of monetary policy can be explained in a 
similar manner with structural differences. Confidence in the longer-term 
dynamism and short-term flexibility of the US economy motivated the 
Federal Reserve Board to allow the very strong tightening of monetary 
conditions during the upswing in 1999-2000 that was documented above. 
The subsequent downturn could thus be met with an unprecedented lowering 
of policy interest rates, which had a strong impact on the economy, given its 
flexibility and financial structure. We will show below that that the 
transatlantic difference in the degree to which demand reacts to lower 
interest rates also provides the best explanation for the emergence of the 
unprecedented US current account deficit. 
A related factor that contributed to the initial wrong setting of fiscal and 
structural policy was that the weakness of the Euroland economy was 
initially not recognised. We showed above that the cyclically adjusted 
deficits for the euro area were around 2% of GDP in 2000 and 2001. EMU AT RISK | 9 
 
However, this data is based on today’s estimate of the output gap during 
these two years. At the time, i.e. when the European Commission published 
the spring 2001 forecast, the cyclically adjusted deficit for 2000 and 2001 
was estimated at only 0.7% of GDP (and the convergence programmes of 
that year implied that this should have turned into small surpluses by the year 
2004). Fiscal policy, if measured by today’s data on cyclically adjusted 
deficits, has thus been stable, but if one measures policy on the basis of 
contemporaneous estimates, it has deteriorated considerably.  
An important factor in the evolution of fiscal policy was thus the 
overestimation of potential output growth in Europe. Part of this 
development had already been visible by 2000-01, because productivity had 
already started to decline by then. But under the influence of the ‘Lisbon 
bubble’, it was generally assumed that potential growth would increase 
because the structural reforms (guided by the Lisbon process) would 
simultaneously increase productivity and employment. These growth 
expectations were only revised as disappointing data kept coming in year 
after year. All fiscal policy could do at that point was to limit the damage by 
not letting deficits go completely out of control. However, the limits of the 
SGP were in fact progressively loosened as country after country found itself 
politically unable to keep expenditure under control when both demography 
and economic growth were deteriorating trend-wise. 
The key to understanding transatlantic differences in policy-making is that 
there were no similar downward revisions of growth in the US. Figure 1.4 
documents this by showing the estimates of the output gap for the crucial 
year 2000 for both the US and Euroland. The bars show for each year the 
output gap for the year 2000 as successively estimated by the OECD.  
For example, at the end of 2000 it was estimated that the eurozone’s output 
was below its potential (negative output gap of 0.3). Over time, however, the 
eurozone’s potential was continuously reduced. With today’s estimates of 
potential growth for Euroland much lower, the OECD now estimates that 
Euroland’s output in the year 2000 was actually 1.7% above its potential. 
The realisation that Euroland’s potential had been overestimated did not 
come suddenly, in one step; rather, each year the estimates of potential 
output were reduced by a small amount. By contrast, the ex-post estimates of 
US potential growth have varied much less, and the direction of the revisions 
was the opposite. In 2000, it was believed that US output had been 2.5% 
above potential. The newer estimates are based on a higher US potential, and 
thus result in a smaller output gap. 10 | 7
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Figure 1.4 Changing output gap estimates for the year 2000 
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Sources:  OECD  Economic Outlook, Autumn 2000, Autumn 2001, Autumn 2002, 
Autumn 2003 and Autumn 2004. 
1.4  Longer-term causes of the transatlantic difference in 
potential growth 
We have argued so far that a key cause of the lack of an effective policy 
response to the downturn after 1999-2000 was the slowdown in potential 
growth in Europe and its possible causes and cures (see Gros et al., 2003 and 
2004b). There is by now broad agreement that this slowdown has at least two 
causes: insufficient capital accumulation and a slowdown of the 
‘unexplained’ part of productivity. 
The first reason for the under-performance of the European economy relative 
to that of the US can be documented most clearly by looking at the net 
capital stock per employed person. Figure 1.5 shows the ratio of the eurozone 
values to those for the US. It is apparent that until around 1996-97, the 
eurozone was catching up to the US with the eurozone’s capital stock 
approaching that of the US, but after this period the eurozone started falling 
behind the US at an increasing pace. EMU AT RISK | 11 
 
Figure 1.5 Insufficient investment as a cause of the productivity slowdown in 
the euro area 
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Source: Own calculations based on AMECO data. 
In terms of the part of productivity that does not depend on the accumulation 
of capital, the relative performance of Euroland has been even worse. As 
Figure 1.6 below shows, the level of total factor productivity has constantly 
declined relative to that of the US. 
Since productivity is a slow-moving variable, the drop in recent years implies 
that the prospects for a quick turnaround must be dim. But what about the 
horizon beyond the next few years? It is sufficient to look at the expectations 
for growth over the next 10 years as published by Consensus Forecasts to see 
that growth is likely to remain low for some time. Between the peak of the 
bubble in 2000 and today, long-term growth expectations have fallen by 
close to three-quarters of a percentage point for the euro area (from 2.66% to 
1.93% p.a.), whereas they have remained roughly constant for the US. 
Moreover, the trend for the euro area is still downwards. See Figure 1.7. 
In the next chapter, we investigate whether there is any reason to hope for a 
turnaround in productivity growth in Euroland. 
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Figure 1.6 Faltering TFP as a cause of the productivity slowdown 
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Figure 1.7 Long-term growth prospects: Euro area vs. the US 
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Chapter 2 
Euroland in the Slow-Growth Trap: 
Causes & Consequences of Slow Growth 
uro area growth has been disappointing and not only over the last few 
years. Over the decades since 1994, real GDP growth averaged only 
2.0%, a little above Japanese growth of 1.2% but considerably below 
the US and the UK track record of around 3%. Clearly, a decade of economic 
underperformance cannot be ascribed to cyclical factors or macroeconomic 
policy mistakes. It points to more deeply-rooted, structural problems.  
The performance of the Euroland economy was even more disappointing in 
the wake of the 2001-02 stock market downturn, with GDP growth averaging 
only 1.2%, compared to 1.0% in Japan and around 2.5% in the US and UK. It 
is possible that on this shorter horizon cyclical policies might have made a 
difference. But as we have argued, Euroland did not really have a 
macroeconomic response to the downturn, mostly because monetary and 
fiscal policy got ‘stuck in the middle’ between long-term constraints and 
short-term expediency. We will argue here that one factor restraining growth 
in Euroland might have been that its structure got ‘stuck in the middle’ 
between low-cost supplies from abroad and the emerging information 
technology sector already occupied by the US. However, a look at the 
performance of the smaller euro area countries shows that stagnation is not 
inevitable. Apparently better policies can make a difference. 
We will then turn to the consequences of low growth – one of which is that it 
affects the quality of economic policy-making. If low growth worsens 
economic policy, a vicious circle might emerge in which bad policies 
impinge negatively on growth. We will illustrate this with reference to two 
emblematic cases: the fate of the Stability Pact and the Services Directive. 
2.1  Continuing productivity weakness in Euroland? 
In past reports, we have provided detailed analyses showing that productivity 
levels and growth rates in the euro area have lagged behind those in other 
regions, notably the US. Against this, some economists have pointed out that 
GDP per hour worked is no lower in the euro area than in the US. However, 
we consider such a comparison fallacious. Since the marginal productivity of 
an additional working hour most likely declines, data have to be adjusted for 
total hours worked. Adjusted data published by the ECB and OECD confirm 
our earlier analysis that productivity levels and growth rates are lower in 
Euroland than in the US (see Papademos, 2004; Nicoletti, 2004). An update 
E 14 | 7
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of our earlier analyses gives a similar picture (see Figure 2.1 below and the 
annex). 
Figure 2.1 GDP per hour worked, US vs. EU11* 
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* EU11 = EU15 - Austria, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal. 
Source: See Annex. 
The only ray of sunshine in the otherwise dark picture that one obtains when 
looking at the evolution of productivity in Euroland is the data point for the 
last year. Preliminary data from 2004 suggest that the trend decline in 
productivity growth has been broken. Output per employed person rose by 
about 1.2% (real GDP growth was 2.0% versus an increase of 0.6% in 
employment). This implies that productivity per worker increased by around 
1.4%. This figure has to be adjusted for changes in working hours and other 
factors, but the as shown in more detail in the Annex the result is still that 
hourly productivity has for the first time shown a small increase, probably 
the increase was around 1.4% during 2004, versus around 1.0%, on average 
during the preceding three years. Part of this increase might have been due to 
the better overall growth registered during 2004, but rough estimates suggest 
that only a small part of this improvement was due to a cyclical effect (again 
see the Annex). 
The most recent data does not cover the entire euro area. But the figures 
referred to so far cover over three-quarters of it. As an aside, we note that the 
data by member country shows that in Germany the longer term decline in 
hours worked continued unabated. This suggests that the highly publicised 
agreements in some large enterprises to work longer hours (for the same pay) EMU AT RISK | 15 
 
did not represent an economy wide phenomenon. It appears that these 
agreements were limited to the sectors most exposed to international 
competition where the pressure to contain unit labour costs was most 
pronounced. 
2.1.1  Euroland ‘stuck in the middle’? 
The previous chapter already provided some elements that explain the 
disappointing growth performance of the eurozone relative to the US. Here 
we would like to suggest an additional consideration which is based on the 
observation that the euro area is facing increasing competition from low-cost 
countries. The opening up of China and India to the global economy coupled 
with the enlargement of the European Union have sharply increased 
competitive pressure on industries using lower-skilled labour. With wages 
rigid on the downside, low-cost competition from abroad has led to the 
crowding out of domestic low-cost suppliers and heavy losses of jobs in the 
tradable goods-producing sectors of the economy. As a result, Euroland 
companies trying to establish themselves as cost leaders in their field have 
had no other choice but to ‘outsource’ the labour-intensive parts of their 
production to low-cost countries outside the euro area. 
The macroeconomic consequences of Euroland’s lack of international 
competitiveness have become more visible since the euro has begun to 
strengthen. Thus, over the last 10 years (from the first quarter of 1995 to the 
fourth quarter of 2004), during which time the real effective exchange rate of 
the euro was unchanged on average, real net exports contributed 0.1 
percentage points to the 2.0% annual average GDP growth of the euro area 
(see Figure 2.2). Since 2002 (first quarter of 2003 to fourth quarter of 2004), 
however, when the euro appreciated by an annual average rate of 8.4% in 
real effective terms, real net exports shaved 0.3 percentage points off the 
1.2% annual average GDP growth.  
A decline in the contribution from real net exports to GDP growth should not 
necessarily be seen as conclusive evidence for a lack of international 
competitiveness of the euro area. It could also reflect strong domestic 
demand growth that is attracting domestic and foreign suppliers, weakening 
exports and boosting imports. However, the performance of key domestic 
demand components does not support such a favourable interpretation. As 
can be seen from Figure 2.3 below, capital formation has been very weak 
since its collapse in the wake of the 2001-02 stock market crash, pointing to 
an unfavourable economic environment. 16 | 7
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Figure 2.2 Contribution of net exports to GDP growth 
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Figure 2.3 Weak investment growth and weak employment growth 
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The weakness of investment has also depressed employment growth (see 
Figure 2.3), which in turn has weakened consumption growth (see Figure 
2.4). Thus, over the last few years, the euro area has suffered from a vicious 
circle of falling external competitiveness and weakening internal demand. 
Figure 2.4 Weak employment growth and weak consumption growth 
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2.1.2  Big and small: Lessons for a more flexible Europe? 
The growth performance of the eurozone has been disappointing – at least if 
one looks at the average. But this average also hides considerable variability 
across countries. Can one discern any systematic pattern in cross-country 
variability across Europe? The answer seems to be yes if one compares the 
performance of the large and the small EMU states. Since the start of EMU, 
the three largest euro area member states (France, but particularly Germany 
and Italy) have consistently underperformed on almost any account. As they 
together represent three-quarters of the GDP of the eurozone, their 
sluggishness is behind the underperformance of the eurozone (and of the EU) 
if compared not only to the present US, but also the past performance of the 
EU itself. 
Since 1999, the growth rates of the three ‘euro-dinosaurs’ have been 1.6 
percentage points lower on average than those of the 8 small euro area 
member countries (see Figure 2.5). This implies a total underperformance of 
10% over this six-year period. The new member states (NMS) have tended to 
perform even better, but this is natural given that they are still in a catch-up 
process. 18 | 7
TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
Figure 2.5 Growth performance of big vs. small (plus new member) states 
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Source: Eurostat, European Commission. 
The large and persistent differences in performance across countries within 
the eurozone contain an important message: since monetary policy has been 
the same for all members, it is thus unlikely that an overly tight monetary 
policy was responsible for the poor growth performance of the eurozone. 
It is interesting to note that the much-better growth performance of the 
smaller countries has been accompanied by much healthier public finances. 
Figure 2.6 below shows that the eight smaller euro area member countries 
have on average run a budget ‘close to balance’, as required by the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP). Did their better growth performance come in spite 
of or because of this fiscal strictness? The facts suggest that the latter might 
be closer to reality since over the last years the smaller countries have 
maintained their lead in terms of growth, and at the same time, the difference 
in fiscal policy has increased. Maybe the leaders of the big three should 
reflect more on the long-term benefits of a strong fiscal policy, rather than 
band together to bend the rules against excessive deficits according to their 
short-term political preferences. 
The much-tighter fiscal policy pursued by the smaller euro area countries 
does not seem to have reduced their growth, but it did have a strong impact 
on their debt levels. A decade ago the smaller euro area countries had a 
slightly higher debt ratio than the Big 3. This situation changed radically 
over the last 10 years. The smaller countries have now a debt ratio that is 
about 20 percentage points of GDP lower than that of the Big 3, whose ratio EMU AT RISK | 19 
 
actually increased over the last decade, and has stagnated at a high level 
since the start of EMU (see Figure 2.7). The smaller countries are thus much 
better prepared to tackle the fiscal implications of population ageing and they 
will also be much less affected by any future increase in interest rates. 
Figure 2.6 Budget balances in big vs. small (plus new) member states 
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Figure 2.7 Public debt ratios in Big 3 vs. Small 8 
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2.2  A vicious circle? 
We have documented so far the weakening of the supply potential of the 
eurozone (on average) and the considerable discrepancy between large and 
small member countries. The former might not be totally exogenous because 
the latter suggests that better policies can mitigate the impact of unfavourable 
circumstances in terms of demography and perhaps even productivity. But 
there is also a potential for vicious circles which amplify the impact of an 
initial negative supply shock. We discuss two potential mechanisms. 
2.2.1  Weak supply leads to weak demand? 
Standard economic theory suggests one way for a self-reinforcing circle to 
emerge, in which weak supply leads to weak demand, which in turn has a 
further negative impact on output.  
One of the key drivers behind the weakness of demand in Euroland has been 
slow growth in both elements of domestic demand: investment and 
consumption. Since Euroland’s households are not really over-indebted (at 
least if compared to their US counterparts), this weakness of consumption is 
not easy to explain a priori. However, this weakness of consumption 
becomes straightforward to understand if one considers the radical revision 
of growth expectations that has taken place since the bursting of the ‘Lisbon 
bubble’. When the so-called Lisbon Strategy
5  was invented, productivity 
growth seemed satisfactory so that growth rates in excess of 2.5% seemed 
within reach. However, the actual results were bitterly disappointing. As 
documented above, productivity growth and expectations have plummeted. 
In Gros et al. (2003), we showed that a revision of growth prospects can have 
a strong impact on demand because of the simple fact that a lower expected 
growth rate implies a lower permanent income which tends to depress 
consumption. 
A similar mechanism operates of course for investment. When growth 
expectations decline, entrepreneurs will also revise downwards their 
estimates of the amount of capital the economy will need in the future. Hence 
investment will be sharply curtailed. 
                                                        
5 At the special European Council of Lisbon in early 2000, the Heads of State 
and Government of the EU solemnly promised to make the EU the “most 
competitive economy” by 2010, setting inter alia precise numerical targets for 
employment rates. These targets were reaffirmed when the entire strategy was 
revised in early 2005, although most of them have now become unattainable. EMU AT RISK | 21 
 
2.2.2  Weak supply leads to weak policies? 
Another way in which weak supply, such as the observed slowdown in 
productivity, can lead to negative second-round effects is by the stress it puts 
on macroeconomic policy. We discuss here two policy fields in which this 
has clearly been happening recently, namely fiscal and structural policies. 
Monetary policy, which is also under immense pressure, is discussed 
separately in chapter 3. 
The crumbling of fiscal policy discipline 
To safeguard against a relapse into past fiscal policy profligacy once the 
Maastricht hurdle into EMU has been passed, EU governments in 1997 
concluded the Stability and Growth Pact. The purpose of the Pact was to 
provide a framework for the operation of the excessive deficit procedure, 
enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, within EMU. In our previous reports, we 
have discussed in some depth the rationale of the Pact and the various 
criticisms voiced against it. Our conclusions then were that fiscal discipline 
was of the essence to ensure government solvency in the longer run against 
the background of an ageing population, and that the SGP, albeit far from 
perfect, was the best available instrument for trying to enforce discipline. 
Unfortunately, during the first few years of EMU, when growth was strong, 
poor implementation of the Pact allowed countries to run structural deficits 
(partially because the ongoing slowdown in potential growth was ignored). 
This set the stage for trouble during the more recent phase of economic 
weakness. As economic growth dropped close to stagnation in 2001-03, 
pressure on budget deficits rose, forcing governments to choose between 
tough (and possibly pro-cyclical) spending cuts to meet the requirements of 
the Stability and Growth Pact and a weakening of the budget constraints. 
With both Germany and France, the heavyweights in the EU and EMU, 
having difficulties adhering to fiscal policy discipline, it is no surprise that 
the Council of Ministers opted for softening the budget constraint. 
In a ‘reform’ of the Pact agreed in March 2005, the Council decided to make 
the exceptions in case of a violation of the 3% deficit limit more generous; to 
allow a number of ‘extenuating circumstances’ in case of deficits above 3% 
of GDP; and to lengthen the periods within which excessive deficits have to 
be slashed (see Table 2.1). As a result, the threat of sanctions for running an 
‘excessive deficit’ has faded into the background and fiscal discipline is 
eroding. Thus, in their recent fiscal projections from April 2005, the 
European Commission expected no further reduction in budget deficits at the 
Euroland level and forecasted France, Italy, Portugal and Greece to run 
deficits in excess of 3% of GDP by 2006. The ratio of government debt to 
GDP, which fell from 76.1% for the euro area as a whole in 1996 to 69.4% in 22 | 7
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2001-02, has already increased again in 2003-04. The risk is now high that it 
will continue to increase also in the medium-term future. With the inevitable 
rise in age-related public spending coming in the next decade, a serious crisis 
of government finances in many Euroland countries within the next 10-15 
years is now a distinct possibility. 
Table 2.1 Key points of the Stability and Growth Pact – Old and new 
 Old  New 
Small overshoot of 
deficit permitted if: 
•  Exceptional event 
(natural disaster) 
•  Recession with GDP 
falling by more than 
2% 
In addition if there are 
structural reforms or 
spending on: 
•  R&D 
•  European political 
goals 
•  International 
solidarity 
•  Investment 
•  Pension reform 
•  EU contributions 
Excessive deficit 
possible if: 
•  Drop of GDP by 
more than 2% 
•  Drop of GDP by 
more than 0.75% if 
downturn sudden, 
output gap positive, 
exceptional 
circumstances 
In addition if economy 
is stagnating or growing 
very slowly 
Time to correct 
excessive deficits: 
One year after 
establishment 
Additional time when 
growth is slow 
Implementation of fiscal 
adjustment programmes 
Within 4 months  Within 6 months 
Medium-term fiscal 
policy goals 
Balanced budget or 
surplus 
1% deficit if low debt or 
high potential growth, 
balanced budget or 
surplus otherwise 
Fiscal policy in good 
times 
  •  0.5% per year deficit 
reduction 
•  Exceptional revenue 
earmarked for debt 
reduction 
•  Early warning EMU AT RISK | 23 
 
The standard defence of this weakening of the SGP has been that countries 
should not be forced into an overly hasty fiscal adjustment. However, there is 
a clear long-term cost associated with allowing countries to run larger fiscal 
deficits: public dis-savings tend to crowd out private investment. There is a 
large literature on the extent of this phenomenon and one could argue that in 
an area that has access to the world capital market it does not really matter 
how much the government (dis-)saves since private investment can still be 
financed by capital imports, if needed.  
We do not wish to review this complex set of arguments in detail here. We 
simply point out that larger deficits in reality have been associated with 
lower investment in recent years. Figure 2.8 shows the tight relationship that 
one can observe over the last years. If this relationship were to prove stable, 
one could conclude that an elimination of the structural deficits, which now 
are over 2% of GDP, should increase investment by about 1 percentage point 
of GDP. As we showed above that a declining capital-labour ratio is one of 
the causes of the productivity slowdown, it is apparent that a price will have 
to be paid for the abandonment of fiscal discipline in term of lower growth in 
future. 
Figure 2.8 Investment and governments savings, 1997-2005 
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The unravelling of structural reform 
The Lisbon Agenda was Europe’s answer to the competitive challenges 
coming from low-cost and high-quality suppliers abroad. A key part of this 24 | 7
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agenda was completion of the internal market, especially for services, which 
was expected to inject new dynamism into the European economy through 
greater competition in a sector accounting for about 70% of employment and 
GDP (see Box 2.1). The Lisbon Agenda was to be complemented by 
structural reform on the national level, especially in the areas of tax, labour 
market and regulatory policy. 
Five years on, the achievements have been truly disappointing. At the EU 
level, a major and perhaps fatal blow was delivered to the Lisbon Agenda in 
March 2005, when the services directive was sent back by the European 
Council to the Commission for a comprehensive overhaul. Most importantly, 
the critics of the Commission’s draft have questioned the country-of-origin 
principle in the mutual recognition of regulations, which is at the heart of the 
single market. According to the critics, this principle, which allows providers 
to offer their services within the EU under home regulations, leads to unfair 
competition and ‘social dumping’. As suppliers based in high-cost, densely 
regulated countries would be pushed out of the market, there would be a 
‘race to the bottom’ in regulations and social protection. To safeguard against 
this, the critics want to reduce the country-of-origin principle to the 
exception and make the country-of-destination principle, where service 
providers have to observe the rules in the consuming country, the rule for the 
supply of services. The result would be a higher level of protection of high-
cost service suppliers and the continuing fragmentation of the European 
services market. 
At the same time, national governments’ efforts at structural reform have 
also run out of steam. Politicians have taken a cautious approach to reform as 
they have feared the ire of their electorates. Hence, in the last few years, euro 
area governments have eased tax burdens somewhat, reduced regulations to 
some extent and eased restrictions in certain segments of the labour market. 
All this were steps in the right direction, but the measures were not 
sufficiently comprehensive to engineer a clear turnaround in the labour 
market and push GDP growth higher. With the results of reform 
disappointing, electorates have become dissatisfied with structural reform 
and are increasingly leaning towards backward-looking protectionist policies. 
Eager to deflect from their own failings and to raise their standing with a 
disgruntled public, politicians are catering to these sentiments by questioning 
the rationale for an open, market-oriented economy. The risk is growing that 
the political backlash over the unsuccessful implementation of reform will 
lead to protectionist policies in Euroland, raising economic inefficiencies and 
dampening economic growth even more. 
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Box 2.1 The Services Directive 
It is often overlooked that, until its presentation in early 2005, the Services 
Directive had been presented as one of the cornerstones of the Lisbon strategy. 
The Commission justifies the proposal (Brussels, 5.3.2004 COM(2004) 2 final/3) 
as follows:  
This proposal for a directive is part of the process of economic reform launched 
by the Lisbon European Council with a view to making the EU the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010. 
Achieving this goal means that the establishment of a genuine internal market in 
services is indispensable. It has not hitherto been possible to exploit the 
considerable potential for economic growth and job creation afforded by the 
services sector because of the many obstacles hampering the development of 
service activities in the internal market. This proposal forms part of the strategy 
adopted by the Commission to eliminate these obstacles and follows on from the 
Report on the State of the Internal Market for Services,
b which revealed their 
extent and significance. 
NECESSITY AND OBJECTIVE 
“Services are omnipresent in today's economy, generating almost 70% of GNP 
and jobs and offering considerable potential for growth and job creation. Realising 
this potential is at the heart of the process of economic reform launched by the 
Lisbon European Council and aimed at making the EU the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010. It has not so far been 
possible to exploit fully the growth potential of services because of the many 
obstacles hampering the development of services activities between the Member 
States.” 
This proposal for a Directive forms part of a political process launched in 2000 by 
the European Council: 
In March 2000, the Lisbon European Council adopted a programme of economic 
reform aimed at making the EU the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010. In this context, the EU Heads of 
State and Government invited the Commission and the Member States to devise a 
strategy aimed at eliminating the obstacles to the free movement of services.
c 
 
a “An Internal Market Strategy for Services”, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament, COM(2000) 888 final, 29.12.2000. 
b Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on “The State of 
the Internal Market for Services”, COM(2002) 441 final, 30.7.2002. 
c Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 24.3.2000, paragraph 17. The need to 
take action in these fields was also highlighted at the Stockholm and Barcelona summits in 
2001 and 2002. 
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Towards the end of the 1990s, some observers were wondering whether the 
first ten years of the new millennium would not turn into the decade of 
Europe. To some extent, these hopes for a European revival were reflected in 
the ambitious goal set in the Lisbon agenda launched in 2000 to create ‘the 
most dynamic knowledge-based economy of the world by the end of this 
decade’. In view of the experience of recent years and with only five more 
years to go to meet the goal, we may now conclude that this is very unlikely 
to be Europe’s decade. In fact, future economic historians may well conclude 
that this was the decade when the secular decline of Europe was reaffirmed. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of the 1980s appeared to open a new 
future for Europe, and at the beginning of the decade, Europe set itself high 
political and economic goals. But the next decade witnessed the 
consolidation of US political and economic weight in the world.  
With the rejection of the draft Constitution by voters in France and the 
Netherlands Europe is likely to miss both its political and economic goals. 
We will return to the longer-term outlook for Europe in chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3 
Monetary Policy for a Slow Growth 
Economy 
e argued in the preceding chapters that the ECB had been much 
less activist in its policy than had the Federal Reserve. Could it 
have done more? We start by showing that cutting interest rates to 
1% in 2003 would have offset the tightening of conditions induced by the 
appreciation of the euro, but it would not have qualitatively changed the 
assessment of relative inaction with respect to the United States. We then 
turn to an analysis of the ECB’s public communications over this same 
period and to what extent did they fit its policy (sitting tight is also a policy). 
After these more short-run considerations, this chapter analyses in more 
detail a longer-term aspect of monetary policy that has gained in importance 
since the start of EMU, namely the consequences of allowing a liquidity 
overhang to build up. Some economists may perhaps argue that ‘liquidity 
overhang’, or ‘excessive credit growth’, is a meaningless concept. Money 
and credit growth simply reflect real economic and price growth without 
exerting any influence on these variables. We do not want to enter here into 
the debate about the causality of money and prices. We only note that money 
and credit growth that cannot be explained as responding to the needs of an 
economy growing at potential and a desired rate of inflation should alert us 
to potential future risks to price and/or financial stability and make us 
question the appropriateness of the stance of monetary policy. Thus, we 
subscribe to the conventional wisdom that, in the long-run, inflation is a 
monetary phenomenon, and that central banks should always keep an eye on 
the long-run. 
The temptation to look at the short run becomes especially strong when price 
stability seems assured ‘as far as the eye can see’, i.e. for the next few years. 
This explains the strength of the pressure on the ECB to ‘get the economy 
moving’. However, we show in the last section that a monetary policy that 
focuses on the output gap (because price stability seems assured) is liable to 
make serious errors as well because estimates of the output gap are also 
subject to a wide margin of uncertainty. This is particularly the case for the 
euro area, as was documented in chapter 1 above. The persistent uncertainty 
about the growth potential for the eurozone thus suggests that the ECB is 
justified in placing less emphasis on cyclical stabilisation policy. The 
example of the Federal Reserve is misleading in this area as well because the 
growth potential of the US seems to have been much more stable. 
W28 | 7
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3.1  Not enough loosening? 
The ECB has now held rates at an historically low level for over two years. 
However, this does not seem to have been enough to get the Euroland 
economy going. One explanation of this apparent failure might be that the 
appreciation of the euro led to a tightening of monetary conditions despite 
the constant low level of interest rates. This leads to the question: Could the 
ECB have done more to support the eurozone economy? 
It is true that monetary policy could have been even more accommodative, as 
it failed to offset the impact of the strengthening currency. But how much 
could the EB have achieved? Figure 3.1 below shows a counterfactual 
exercise, where the ECB cuts interest rates to 1% in 2003 and keeps them 
stable until now. That move would have offset the appreciation of the euro 
during the period and prevented monetary conditions from tightening, 
providing a final level of monetary conditions similar to that of the US; 
Nevertheless, the ECB would still have been a less activist central bank than 
the Federal Reserve over the period. 
Figure 3.1 Comparison of the monetary conditions index: US vs. the 
eurozone 
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
M
C
I
 
(
1
9
9
5
-
2
0
0
5
 
=
 
1
0
0
)
US MCI Eur MCI Hypothetical Eur MCI with i=1%  
Source: Deutsche Bank, Global Markets Research. 
The exercise undertaken here assumes that the exchange rate would have 
moved in the same fashion despite the lower level of interest rates in the EU. 
Although this runs against economic intuition, it might not be far from what 
might have happened. The strong downward trend of the dollar of the last 
two years is widely perceived as a corollary of the huge US current account 
imbalance. This imbalance would probably not have been materially affected EMU AT RISK | 29 
 
by a loosening of policy in Euroland. It might actually have worsened it if 
one believes the major macroeconomic models.  
Thus, with the benefit of hindsight, the ECB failed to anticipate, or to react 
promptly to the tightening of monetary conditions that was induced by the 
persistent appreciation of the euro over the last two years. As we will explore 
below, conflicting short- and longer-term objectives probably lie at the heart 
of this apparent inaction.  
3.2  Between two pillars 
Even if to a lesser extent than the Federal Reserve, the ECB maintained an 
expansionary monetary policy stance during the past year, stimulating the 
real economy (and thus giving policy-makers ample room to implement 
economic reforms and consolidate government finances). Against the 
background of its long-standing opposition against a monetary policy aimed 
at supporting growth and against ex-ante coordination with fiscal and 
structural policy, the ECB’s accommodating monetary policy stance (which 
we advocated last year) is noteworthy. Unfortunately, the policy had none of 
the desired effects: growth remained lacklustre and governments neither 
exerted fiscal discipline nor progressed much with structural reform.  
Despite this shortage of progress in reform and accelerating liquidity growth, 
the ECB (at the time of going to publication) still shies away from fading out 
the strong monetary stimulus. The simple reason for this is that growth 
remains weak and inflation low.  
The ECB is thus caught between a rock and a hard place. The rock consists 
of continuing sluggish real growth and subdued goods and wage inflation. 
The economic analysis within the ECB’s monetary policy strategy thus 
argues for unchanged or lower interest rates. The hard place consists of 
dynamic money and credit growth (which has raised housing prices). The 
monetary analysis is arguing for higher rates. With the two pillars of the 
strategy sending different signals, the ECB apparently has been in a dither 
about rate cuts or hikes for the last 15 months. This is beginning to raise 
questions about the credibility of its monetary policy strategy. 
3.2.1  Money and credit in the short run 
We will argue in more detail below that the longer-run evolution of monetary 
aggregates provides an important indicator of future problems for monetary 
policy. However, even a less ‘monetarist’ reading of the available data shows 
that the message from the ‘monetary pillar’ is at present rather encouraging. 
Figure 3.2 below shows the main components of credit expansion over the 
last years. It is apparent that those indicators that might signal the strength of 
general economic activity, growth consumer credit and loans to non-financial 30 | 7
TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
enterprises, did indeed remain at rather low rates (only 3% p.a.) between 
mid-2002 and early 2004. Since then, however, these two indictors have 
accelerated considerably and are now expanding at an annual rate of around 
6%, which should be compatible with a considerable pick-up in both 
consumption and investment – although their sluggishness suggests that they 
may be also facing very strong headwinds. It appears that the cycle in 
housing-related loans was much less strong. This type of credit kept growing 
at 8% and is now expanding at an annual rate of close to 10%. We shall 
return to this issue below. 
Figure 3.2 Where is all the money going? 
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3.2.2  Speaking with two tongues? 
With the two pillars giving conflicting signals, the communications strategy 
has been severely tested. The ECB has preferred not to admit openly that it is 
in a quandary. Instead, it has simply vacillated from one stance to another: 
when economic conditions seemed to pick up it has seemed to lean towards a 
rate increase, only to change tack when current conditions deteriorated.  
Thus, during the first quarter of 2004, a weakening of monthly indicators 
brought the Council close to a cut. But uncertainty about the degree of 
economic weakness and the continuing liquidity overhang appears to have 
prevented a move. By the summer of 2004, the economy seemed in better 
shape, and money and credit growth picked up. The Council geared up for a 
rate hike in autumn (which short-term futures rates duly priced in), but was EMU AT RISK | 31 
 
stopped again by renewed doubts about economic growth towards the end of 
2004. The events of this year have followed the by now familiar pattern: 
Renewed optimism about the economy in the first quarter again created 
momentum for a rate hike (again anticipated by the markets), but renewed 
doubts about the economy at the beginning of the second quarter seem to 
have weakened the resolve for a move. Unable to take a decision, it seems 
that the Council retreated to the position of ‘a rate cut is not an option’ as the 
smallest common denominator. However, the ECB’s continued dithering 
between the two pillars of the strategy is beginning to cast doubt on the 
credibility of its approach to monetary policy. 
The extent of this dithering can actually be documented by measuring the 
frequency with which the editorial in each monthly bulletin refers to upside 
or downside risks to price stability (see Box 3.1 for details). A more frequent 
reference to ‘upside risks’ to price stability is associated with a more hawkish 
stance, hence the name ‘hawkometer’. 
Figure 3.3 shows a measure of ‘hawkishness’ (see Deutsche Bank, 2004) of 
the Council together with the refinancing rate since the inception of EMU. 
As can be seen from the figure, changes in the tone of ECB communications 
tended to predict rather well policy rate changes – at least until mid-2003. 
Since then the ECB has left its policy rate unchanged, but the tone of its 
communications has been very volatile.  
Figure 3.3 The hawkometer and the refinancing rate 
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Box 3.1 The hawkometer: An analysis of ‘ECB speak’ 
Any evaluation of ‘ECB speak’ in publications or policy-makers’ comments 
must remain highly subjective. What may appear ‘hawkish’ to one analyst 
may seem quite ‘neutral’ to another. In order to reduce the subjective element 
in this analysis, one can rely on a more objective measure of the 
‘hawkishness’ of the dominating view within the Council.  
The measure used here was developed by Deutsche Bank (see DB, 2004). It is 
based on the editorial text of the Monthly Bulletins starting from January 
1999 and ending in April 2005. To rank ‘ECB speak’ from dovish to hawkish 
on a numerical scale, we first had to identify relevant signals in the texts. 
Based on a few selected texts from the entire sample, it was concluded that 
recognition of ‘upside risks to price stability’ (or very close substitutes to this 
expression) represented a ‘hawkish’ statement, and that the detection of 
‘downside risks to activity’ (and close substitutes to this) represented ‘dovish’ 
statements. We then counted the number of independent appearances of these 
statements in the editorial texts. For instance, if the economic and monetary 
analysis detected upside risks to price stability, we assigned the text a value of 
+2. If the ‘upside risks’ to price stability were not only summarised but re-
emphasised in the summary section, we assigned the text a value of +3, etc. 
The same rating – with negative sign – was applied when the text stated that 
there were “downside risks to economic activity” (or close substitutes to this). 
Applying this method to the editorials of the Monthly Bulletin after November 
2001 gives a snapshot of views within the Council on a monthly basis. Before 
November 2001, however, the Council discussed interest rates and 
communicated its findings on a bi-weekly basis. During this period, the 
editorials of the Bulletin tended to reflect discussions during the previous two 
meetings. Hence, it is possible that our method suggests more gradual changes 
in view during the earlier period. This should not be a major problem for the 
results, however, given the generally rather crude nature of our exercise. 
What caused the ECB to change its tune so much over time? As discussed 
formally above, the main reason was that the short-term economic outlook 
kept changing. In principle a monetary policy that is geared towards the 
medium run should not be much affected by short-term sentiment indicators, 
such as the PMI (Purchasing Managers Index) which simply shows the 
evaluation of current business conditions. But as Figure 3.4 shows, the ECB 
has recently been adjusting the tone of its communications in response to 
changes in the PMI indicator. This figure shows simply the Hawkometer and 
the PMI minus 50 (this value is usually taken as the dividing line between 
expansion and contraction). It is difficult to understand why the ECB seems 
to have followed the PMI with a lag of several months. Until mid-2003, the 
ECB seemed to have been closely aligned with the PMI, but as its discomfort EMU AT RISK | 33 
 
about monetary growth rose it appeared to become more hawkish, perhaps in 
the expectation that generous money growth would quickly turn the economy 
around. When this did not happen, the ECB softened its tone, only to be 
caught off guard again when the PMI did turn around.  
Figure 3.4 The hawkometer and the PMI 
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Source: Deutsche Bank, Global Markets Research. 
The markets seem to have discounted the hawkish tone of the ECB for some 
time as can be seen from the Euribor futures. Figure 3.5 shows that the short 
term rate expected to prevail in December 2005 has almost continuously 
been on a downward trend, despite the gyrations in the PMI. The hawkish 
pronouncements of the ECB have thus lost credibility for some time. 
Clearly, the Council has been hoping that the signals from the economic and 
monetary analysis will coincide eventually, setting the stage for an 
uncontroversial move. With money and credit growth showing no signs of 
abatement and consensus forecasts supporting the scenario of a ‘moderate 
recovery’, such a constellation may still materialise later this year. But even 
if the outlook for growth remains uncertain, the Council should acknowledge 
the increasing need to raise rates as long as money and credit growth exceed 
appropriate levels. Continued procrastination under these circumstances 
would lead to doubts about the Council’s ability to take decisions; a cut to 
stimulate growth would damage the credibility of the recently reaffirmed 
two-pillar monetary policy strategy. Hence, the ECB will eventually have to 
reduce its accommodating monetary policy, albeit at a very measured pace. 
A rate cut, as demanded by several politicians and academics, would only 34 | 7
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become an option if economic weakness were accompanied by weakening 
money and credit growth. 
Figure 3.5 Euribor futures prices 
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In the course of the last few years, the ECB has considerably refined its 
monetary analysis (Issing, 2005). The Bank has also fortified its economic 
analysis by providing economic forecasts on a quarterly basis. However, it 
has remained strangely silent on how it ‘cross-checks’ between the two 
pillars of its analysis. Clearly, ‘cross-checking’ is not a problem if both 
analyses point in the same direction. It also is fairly easy if signals from one 
of the pillars can be dismissed as distorted (as was the case for the monetary 
pillar in 2001-03). However, what does ‘cross-checking’ imply for monetary 
policy when the two pillars give persistently conflicting signals, as has been 
the case since 2003? What is the weight given to short-term considerations 
coming from the economic analysis and to long-term issues raised by the 
monetary analysis? When does the short-term turn into the long-term? 
In the following, we shall argue that, when in doubt, the ECB has given too 
much weight to short-term signals at the expense of long-term indicators. 
The costs and benefits of its short-term bias have not become visible yet, but 
as EMU matures, this will change. Clearly, to defend its track record, the 
E C B  m u s t  s h e d  m o r e  l i g h t  o n  t h e  way the Council ‘cross-checks’ the 
economic and monetary analyses and draws its policy conclusions from that 
process. EMU AT RISK | 35 
 
3.3  What happened to the monetary pillar? 
When the ECB started to be responsible for monetary policy, it emphasised 
that the first pillar for its decisions on monetary policy had to be an analysis 
of monetary policy conditions and accordingly set a ‘reference’ value for the 
rate of growth of the main monetary aggregate on which it chose to 
concentrate, i.e. M3. Everything else being equal, growth rates of M3 above 
this reference value (4.5%) were meant to signal a need for tightening policy. 
Since the start of EMU, however, actual growth of both money and credit has 
consistently been above the reference rates as shown in Figure 3.6 below.  
Figure 3.6 Money and credit in the eurozone 
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Nominal GDP grew over this six-year period close to 30%, which is very 
close to the compound growth M3 would have had if the reference rate had 
been observed over this period. In reality, however, the stock of money is 
now almost 20 percentage points above this level. 
One might argue that less emphasis should be placed on monetary and credit 
aggregates in a time of rapid evolution of the financial markets, but upon 
closer inspection, this argument is much less convincing. It was widely 
expected that the introduction of the euro would trigger a process of 
disintermediation whereby economies of scale in securitised markets would 
allow firms to finance themselves without recourse to bank credit. Moreover, 
households would then have a much wider range of investments available, 
which would induce them to hold a smaller share of their assets in bank 
accounts. Both arguments suggest that the structural changes coming with 36 | 7
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the euro would actually reduce the ratio of credit and money relative to GDP. 
The expectation was that the eurozone would move closer to the US model in 
which banks play a much smaller role in the financing of corporate 
investment and in the US the ratio of both credit and money to GDP is much 
lower than in the eurozone. As Figure 3.6 shows, however, both money and 
credit actually increased trend-wise relative to GDP with the result that the 
ratio of both money and credit to GDP increased by about 15%.  
A transatlantic comparison is again instructive. Figure 3.7 shows the 
evolution of the ratio of money and credit to GDP also for the US. It is 
apparent that on this metric there is little difference. The popular image of 
the Federal Reserve flooding the US economy with liquidity compared to a 
much stingier ECB that at least constantly talks about the need to keep 
money growth in check is thus wrong. Monetary policy on (bank) credit 
expansion could even be seen as having been slightly more expansionary in 
the euro area than in the US.  
Figure 3.7 A transatlantic comparison of excess liquidity 
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3.4  The costs of ignoring the monetary pillar 
At first glance, money and credit growth above earlier-desired levels does 
not seem to have exacted any costs from the economy. Between January 
1999 and April 2005, the harmonised yearly consumer price inflation rate 
averaged 2%. This appears to be close enough to qualify as meeting the 
ECB’s goal of keeping inflation below, but close to 2% over the medium-
term. Still, without turning an entirely blind eye to money and credit 
developments, no economist can feel entirely relaxed about this performance. 
We have learned from past experience that the lag between monetary policy 
and its effects on inflation can be long and variable. Money growth above the 
rate absorbed by money demand will at some point raise prices, be they for EMU AT RISK | 37 
 
goods, services or assets. Hence, even if consumer price inflation has 
remained well-behaved so far and there are no signs of an imminent rise, it is 
too early to dismiss upside risks to price stability resulting from liquidity 
growth. 
More visible have been the effects of strong credit growth on housing prices. 
While it is true that price increases for real estate (at 7.2% in 2004) have not 
been alarming in the euro area average, prices have increased substantially 
for an extended period of time in a number of countries (with housing price 
increases in Spain and France of 17% and 12%, respectively). Indeed, the 
average increase for the euro area was held down primarily by the lacklustre 
real estate market in Germany. Prices rose, occasionally at high rates, in 
almost every other country. 
ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet has drawn some comfort from the 
contained level of price inflation for housing in the euro area average. As 
long as that average did not rise to worrisome levels, he seemed to imply, 
there was no reason for the ECB to become concerned. We do not find this 
view convincing.  
Real estate market developments have always been heavily influenced by 
regional supply and demand conditions, and price bubbles have tended to be 
concentrated in certain regions. At the same time, however, the deflation of 
regional price bubbles, given a critical size of the affected region, has tended 
to have supra-regional effects. Two examples may suffice to illustrate the 
point. 
First, in the late 1980s, there was a property price boom in many parts of the 
US; but particularly in states like Texas and California, fuelled by strong 
lending growth by savings and loan banks. While the property price booms 
were localised, the entire US savings and loans industry was severely shaken 
when the bubble burst. To help the sector recover, the Federal Reserve kept 
interest rates at very low levels for an extended period of time. When they 
eventually raised rates in 1994, they induced a severe correction in world 
bond markets. 
Second, in the early 1990s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall and German 
unification, property prices rose strongly in eastern Germany. Construction 
investment and mortgage lending boomed, until overbuilding caused prices 
to collapse in the mid-1990s. The implosion of property prices weakened 
German consumption, investment and GDP growth. Although prices have 
now stabilised, the collapse of the building industry caused severe economic 
problems given the limited flexibility of the German labour market. 
Moreover, the stagnation of house prices certainly contributed to the ongoing 
weakness of consumption in Germany. Given the weight of the German 
economy in the eurozone, the collapse of its housing market was a major 38 | 7
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reason why the ECB had to keep interest rates at relatively low levels for a 
long time. These and other examples from economic history suggest that 
regional property-price cycles can have supra-regional effects. Recently, 
property prices have risen especially quickly in France and Spain. These 
countries are certainly large enough to cause euro area-wide problems should 
a housing price bubble suddenly deflate. 
Figure 3.8 illustrates the close link that exists between housing prices and 
consumption (the correlation coefficient is about 0.80). A property price 
crash in these (or other) countries would almost certainly weaken private 
consumption through wealth effects and increase uncertainty about the 
economic outlook. It would, of course, also lead to an abrupt fall of new 
construction investment. 
Figure 3.8 Housing prices and consumption 
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Moreover, a fall in housing prices may impair a part of the outstanding loans 
of the banking sector and force banks to raise reserves. This could reduce 
their willingness to extend credit to businesses and consumers. A slump in 
demand in the countries suffering from housing price deflation could spill 
over to other euro area countries and, in the worst case, pull the entire euro 
area into recession or even deflation. Thus, excessive money and credit 
growth increases the risks to price stability from two sides: it could stoke 
consumer price inflation in the longer run, or cause consumer price deflation 
by creating a negative asset price bubble. EMU AT RISK | 39 
 
The fact that an asset price bubble does not lead to consumer price inflation 
while it is building up and might even lead to deflation once it bursts 
explains why even longer-term inflation expectations might not be a good 
guide to policy. The cost of letting these bubbles emerge does not come in 
the form of higher inflation, but a misallocation of resources (empty houses) 
and prolonged economic weakness. It is the latter that is the most relevant 
danger for Euroland given its low degree of flexibility. 
A longer-term perspective is again useful to measure the scale of the 
monetary overhang at present. Figure 3.9 shows that the scale of the present 
divergence between money growth and inflation had only one precedent, 
namely the early 1990s when a scissor opened between accelerating money 
growth and inflation which was a downwards trend. The scissors closed in 
the middle of the decade, with only a slight acceleration of inflation. The 
main event that led to the two series to convergence was the strong 
deceleration of money growth which preceded the recession of 1995 (and a 
subsequent period of slow growth). The deceleration in money growth was in 
turn due first to a tightening by the Deutsche Bundesbank, which saw 
German inflation rising and then a considerable increase in interest rates as 
the central banks of those countries under speculative attack tried to maintain 
price stability in the face of large devaluations. 
Figure 3.9 Inflation: A monetary phenomenon 
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There is another parallel between the current situation and that of the early 
1990s: at the time, exchange rates were kept fixed within the ERM although 
some countries were continuously losing competitiveness vis-à-vis the core 
of the ERM, Germany. That this situation was unsustainable became clear 
only in the currency crisis that started in late 1992, precipitated by the 
combination of a tightening by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the uncertainty 
surrounding a French referendum. The next chapter will analyse in more 
detail the dangers inherent in the present situation. 
3.5 The costs of relying on the economic pillar alone 
Many advocates of inflation-targeting dismiss the monetary pillar as 
superfluous and propose to rely on inflation forecasts as a guidepost for 
monetary policy. To produce inflation forecasts, they generally recommend a 
Phillips curve model. However, this requires output gap estimates and 
forecasts, which are subject to considerable measurement error. 
In Figure 1.4 above, we traced OECD estimates of output gaps for the year 
2000 over time. While these estimates remained fairly stable for the US, they 
changed dramatically for Euroland. Assuming that the most recent estimate 
(showing an output gap for that year of more than 1.5%) is the more reliable 
one, we may conclude that economic policies based on the first estimate 
(showing an output gap of almost -0.5%) would certainly have been 
misguided. Based on today’s data, monetary policy should have been 
considerably tighter during 2000 to cool down an overheating economy, 
whereas the estimates from that year suggested that an easy policy was 
appropriate because there was still slack in the economy. 
This is exactly what also happened to fiscal policy, which was too 
expansionary in 2000. Because of the policy error then, budget deficits grew 
beyond the limits set in the Maastricht Treaty during the following downturn, 
setting the stage for the breakdown of fiscal policy discipline that we are now 
witnessing. These developments support the scepticism against an activist 
fiscal policy that emerged in the early 1980s. Based on the bad experience of 
the 1970s, when an activist fiscal policy often had procyclical effects and led 
to an explosion of government deficits and debt, supply-side-oriented 
economists advocated a medium-term orientation of fiscal policy aimed at 
maintaining government solvency. For a while, the medium-term orientation 
of fiscal policy led to a decline in budget deficits and debt ratios in many 
countries. More recently, however, more activist fiscal policies have come 
into fashion again. 
The fiscal policy experience of the last decades holds interesting lessons for 
monetary policy. Many economists advocate the minimisation of the output 
gap as the main intermediate target of monetary policy. Through this, they 
expect monetary policy to achieve its final objective of keeping inflation at a EMU AT RISK | 41 
 
certain level. These economists have criticised the ECB’s two-pillar 
monetary policy strategy as inappropriate and confusing. According to them, 
the monetary pillar is redundant and should be scrapped and the economic 
pillar should be used as a framework for inflation targeting. However, given 
the measurement and forecasting errors for the output gap in recent years, a 
monetary policy focusing exclusively on the output gap would surely have 
made errors as severe as those of fiscal policy. In addition to a deteriorating 
outlook for government finances, the euro area could now be confronted with 
severe risks to price stability. 
Against this background, the monetary analysis contained in the monetary 
pillar of the ECB’s strategy can help to avoid policy errors and support a 
medium-term orientation of monetary policy necessary to preserve price 
stability. In our view, monetary and credit developments provide at least as 
much, if not more, reliable information for monetary policy-makers (see 
Figure 3.10) than, for example, the PMI. Credit growth has usually been 
closely correlated with GDP growth. This implies that the fact that credit 
growth continues unabated, and that its level is consistent with growth at the 
eurozone’s (admittedly meagre) potential, should be a strong signal that 
monetary policy does not need to be loosened. Hence, we feel that the ECB 
has paid too little – and not too much – attention to monetary developments 
in recent years. 
Figure 3.10 Information from the monetary pillar  
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Chapter 4 
EMU’s Coming Stress Test 
e have documented in this report the inability of the usual 
macroeconomic levers to get the Euroland economy on a 
sustainable growth path, as longer-term considerations limited the 
extent to which both fiscal and monetary policy could perform a stabilisation 
role. Pressured by persistently weak growth, a choice was made in favour of 
‘short-termism’: in the fiscal field, the key disciplinary device, the Stability 
Pact, has already effectively been emasculated by politicians. In the 
monetary field, the ECB has ignored the medium-term warning signals 
stemming from the acceleration in money and credit growth. In fact, it looks 
as if fears of political pressures are inducing the ECB to focus on short-term 
growth considerations at the cost of neglecting long-term stability risks. 
In the end, neither short-term demand has been boosted nor long-term 
discipline maintained. The result of this failed attempt to stimulate demand 
(in the face of very sluggish supply) is that Euroland is now faced with rising 
public debt/GDP ratios and a large monetary overhang. The latter has not led 
to incipient inflationary pressures so far, and the current state of labour 
markets suggests that inflation is likely to remain under control in the near-
term. But growing fiscal deficits combined with a rising monetary overhang 
in the face of considerable cost and price rigidities constitute a threat to price 
and financial stability in the euro area. 
In addition, the emergence of widening intra-area divergences could severely 
test the resolve of the Euroland authorities to support the value of the euro, 
which could degenerate in a process of gradual ‘lira-isation’ of the euro.  
4.1  EMU’s potential breaking points resurface 
In the earlier debates about the requirements for economic and monetary 
union, many participants – including senior policy-makers – argued that 
monetary union would not be stable and could not survive in the long run if it 
were not accompanied by more economic flexibility and closer political 
union. The former was seen as necessary to allow better adjustment in the 
absence of country-specific interest and exchange rate changes; the latter was 
seen as necessary to establish democratic legitimisation for a stability-
oriented monetary policy and the conditions for a fiscal policy consistent 
with this conduct of monetary policy. Without closer political union and the 
emergence of a European public will, it was feared that the ECB could come 
under irresistible pressure from national governments to conduct a softer 
monetary policy and that fiscal policy would lack the necessary discipline to 
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ensure price stability in the long-run. In other words, governments could 
pursue their narrow interests at the expense of the public good of price 
stability. 
As preparations for EMU progressed and prospects for closer political union 
faded into the background, it was argued that the statutory independence of 
the ECB would shield it against political influence. Moreover, to ensure 
some fiscal policy discipline, the Stability and Growth Pact was agreed at the 
Amsterdam European Council meeting in 1997.  
In the first few years of EMU, neither the degree of economic flexibility nor 
the stability of the fiscal framework or the independence of the ECB was 
severely tested. However, as growth has faded, tensions have increased. 
Optimists hoped that economic tensions would eventually break the existing 
structural rigidities. Unfortunately, it seems that the rigidities are prevailing 
while fiscal policy discipline is giving way. Since this will not keep growth 
going, political pressure will increasingly be brought to bear on the ECB to 
support economic activity in the short-term by weakening the euro internally 
and externally. 
4.2  A new element: Intra-area divergences 
Growth differentials among EMU member countries have so far been rather 
limited and at a stable level. The weighted standard deviation of the growth 
rates of the euro area members has barely moved between 1999 and 2004 as 
the large three euro area members tended to move broadly together. As 
documented above, the two main laggards in the eurozone were Germany 
and Italy, with France falling somewhat in between them and the more 
dynamic smaller countries. However, any apparent similarity between 
developments in Italy and Germany has been superficial. It is now becoming 
clear that a chasm has opened up between them under the surface. 
Germany entered EMU with an overvalued exchange rate, but it has regained 
competitiveness through a process that used to be called ‘competitive 
deflation’. By contrast, Italy has continuously lost competitiveness and hence 
market shares. These large relative movements in competitive positions did 
not translate earlier into different growth rates because of the offsetting 
tendencies in the housing markets. As documented above, the low interest 
rate environment fostered by the ECB’s policy and the global developments 
(this will be documented in a forthcoming special report) led to a housing 
boom in a number of countries, including Italy. This has so far sustained 
consumption in Italy, while overbuilding especially in the eastern part of the 
country during the early 1990s lead to persistent weakness in the real estate 
market and consumption in Germany. However, the cumulated loss in Italian 44 | 7
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competitiveness has become so severe that its negative effects can no longer 
be offset by the housing boom. 
4.3  Italy on the brink 
Italy is likely to provide the first major stress test of EMU. Its economy has 
slipped back into recession in 2004Q4-2005Q1.
6  However, in contrast to 
developments in 2003, the most recent downturn has been more pronounced 
and there are presently no sign of a bottoming out of the contraction in the 
near future. As a consequence, Italian real GDP could now drop in 2005 in a 
recession almost as deep as that of 1993, when real GDP contracted by 0.9%. 
As mentioned above, a key reason for Italy’s economic weakening has been 
a pronounced loss in external competitiveness. With unit labour costs in Italy 
rising by 1.3 percentage points faster than in the Euroland average – and by 
2.5 pp faster than in Germany – in 1999-2004, Italy’s real effective exchange 
rate (based on relative export prices) rose by 15.6% between 1999 and 2004, 
compared to a 1.7% increase in Germany and a 1.3% drop in France. This, in 
combination with the accompanying deterioration in business and investor 
confidence, has led to a sharp decline in growth since 2000 and, most likely, 
recession in 2005. 
When Italy fell into recession in 1993, the lira depreciated substantially. It 
fell by altogether 34% against the ecu, the predecessor of the euro, between 
1992 and 1995. Producer price inflation accelerated from 1.9% in 1992 to 
7.8% in 1995, but the total increase in prices by 16% between 1992 and 1995 
was much less than the depreciation of the exchange rate. As a result, Italy 
regained competitiveness. This gain in competitiveness was large enough to 
overcome the negative impact of the increase in interest rates so that GDP 
growth recovered, after an initial fall, to 2.3% in 1994 and 3.0% in 1995. 
This time, Italy cannot regain competitiveness – and stimulate economic 
growth – through nominal exchange rate depreciation. What is needed is real 
exchange rate depreciation through cost and price cuts. This is how Germany 
improved its external competitiveness and raised economic growth in recent 
years (while many economists and market participants misinterpreted these 
developments as deflation). Thus, German unit labour costs increased by 
only 0.4% in the annual average of 1999-2004, with a substantial drop by 
0.7% yoy occurring in 2004. Helped by increased competitiveness, net 
exports rose and the German economy recovered from stagnation in 2003. 
                                                        
6 This follows a brief recovery in the first three quarters of 2004 from technical 
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However, in contrast to their German counterparts, which learned to live 
with a hard currency and fierce competition in the past, Italian companies 
and trade unions have little experience in rigorous cost and price controls in a 
highly competitive economic environment. They operate in an environment 
characterised by significant restrictions to competition and a soft currency. 
Moreover, while they tend to concentrate more on the production of medium-
quality, price sensitive goods and services, they have made less progress than 
their German counterparts in outsourcing production to low-cost locations. 
All this suggests that it will take Italian companies much longer than their 
German counterparts to improve their competitive position. As a result, the 
medium-term outlook for the Italian economy is rather bleak. 
On top of the loss of competitiveness, one has to ask how long the housing 
boom in Italy will last. Should housing prices stop increasing, or even 
decline, domestic demand would fall even further. The economic situation in 
Italy has thus the potential to develop into a full-blown crisis. Moreover, as 
both the loss of competitiveness and any post-bubble housing market 
weakness require considerable time to be corrected, it is likely that the Italian 
economy will experience a long period of economic stagnation or even 
contraction. 
Table 4.1 All competitiveness indicators point in the same direction 
1999-2004  EU12  Germany France  Italy 
Labour productivity *   0.0  0.9  1.1  0.0 
ULC *  1.6  0.4  1.6  2.9 
Change in the share of exports over 
eurozone (national accounts)  --  +9.3%  -5.6  -14.4 
Exports (customs) *   6.7  7.4  7.4  4.6 
Competitiveness ranking (2004-05)  ---  13  27  47 
REER (ULC)  12.5  -4.8  1.7  10.9 
REER (export prices)  9.2  1.7  -1.3  15.6 
* Average of annual percent changes. The changes in REERs refer to the whole 
period, as the change in the share of exports. 
Note: In the case of EU12, REER is computed against the rest of the world. In the 
case of individual countries, it is against their main 34 trade partners. 
Sources: Haver, European Commission, World Economic Forum and national 
statistical institutes. 
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4.4  The stress test in action 
Unfortunately Italy is not the only country to experience a combination of a 
strong loss of competitiveness whose effect has so far been covered by a 
housing boom. Portugal and Greece are in a similar situation. These two 
countries are also running the highest government budget deficits in the euro 
area – in the case of Greece even before growth is likely to turn down under 
the impact of a slowing housing market and the ongoing loss of 
competitiveness. Even a strong performer like Spain masks under the strong 
growth a deteriorating competitive position that, were its housing market to 
slow down, would put its economic performance at risk. Thus, the list of 
countries at risk is increasing, and could easily become a majority soon. At 
that point, a key political question will have to be answered: Does the 
majority want to undergo the painful process of regaining competitiveness 
through cost and wage control, or is a weaker currency preferable?  
Given the aversion documented above (chapter 2) of especially the large 
member countries against painful structural reform and in view of the likely 
persistence of the economic difficulties, the political systems in the weaker 
countries, in the first instance probably Italy, are likely to abandon fiscal 
policy discipline. The European Commission hopes that the Council of 
Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) will demonstrate that the Stability and Growth 
Pact still exerts a disciplinary influence on EMU members after its recent 
revision. We doubt this. With France and Germany also experiencing severe 
strains in government finances, and Portugal and Greece among its 
‘compagni di sventura’, Italy can count on powerful and numerous allies in 
its likely course towards higher fiscal deficits. 
However, it is crucial to understand that fiscal policy cannot address Italy’s 
long-term competitiveness problem and is hence unlikely to engineer the 
desired economic revival – in the same way that past devaluations of the lira 
only provided only temporary respite. Therefore, Italian policy-makers are 
very likely to step up pressure on the ECB to pursue an even more 
expansionary monetary policy, especially as they would have to bear the 
largest fiscal burden should interest rates increase substantially. French and 
German politicians may not stand in the way of efforts to coax the ECB into 
an easier monetary policy as they have been unable to engineer a reduction 
of unemployment through labour market reform. 
Without European political union, the ECB lacks a public constituency 
supporting its monetary policy stance in the face of political pressure. Public 
support was a cornerstone for the Deutsche Bundesbank’s ability to pursue a 
low-inflation, hard currency policy. It remains to be seen whether the ECB 
can do the same without strong backing from the general public. Should the 
ECB yield to the inevitable political pressures, the switches would be set for 
a higher-inflation, softer-currency EMU. Monetary union is thus likely to EMU AT RISK | 47 
 
undergo a major stress test, which should not come as a surprise. Many 
economists had predicted severe stress before the start of EMU and warned 
that this could result in softening of the common currency or even an 
eventual demise of EMU. What is perhaps surprising is how unprepared 
economic policy-makers, including those at the ECB, presently appear to 
deal with the stress. 
The debate preceding the referendum in France (even more than its outcome) 
showed the severe stress under which policy-makers have come throughout 
the EU. One argument used against the Constitutional Treaty was that it 
validated an excessively liberal economic approach, based on ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
principles. Formally this argument was wrong in that the draft Constitutional 
Treaty would not have changed the economic constitution of the EU. 
However, this argument does have a basis: the EU, and especially EMU, has 
been a catalyst for reforms in many areas (finance, central bank 
independence, etc.) which more often than not have been presented by 
national policy-makers as constraints imposed by ‘Brussels’. Moreover, at 
the European Council of Lisbon, national leaders united to proclaim 
solemnly that the EU would deliver the “most competitive knowledge-based 
economy”. However, as documented amply in previous analyses (and official 
documents), the so-called ‘Lisbon process’ has led to reform inflation: with 
many promises and little action. This failure to deliver – combined with the 
constant sniping against EU rules that were perceived either as too liberal 
(services directive) or too constraining (limits on state aids, limits on fiscal 
deficits) – has undermined the legitimacy of the EU in general. It is only a 
question of time before this general dissatisfaction also reaches the ECB. 
4.5 Policy  conclusions 
We have demonstrated in the earlier chapters of this report how tensions 
between short-term and long-term policy objectives have delivered the worst 
of all possible outcomes: lack of cyclical support and weakening of long-
term discipline. With economic growth continuing to disappoint, the short-
term objective of stimulating growth in the near-term has gained importance, 
inducing structural policy to shelve important reforms, fiscal policy to 
remove constraints to deficit increases, and monetary policy to turn a blind 
eye to accelerating money and credit growth. If policy makers continue to go 
down this route, we are likely to witness the ‘lira-isation’ of the euro. But 
what can be done? 
The key question is whether these stark divergences in performance are the 
result of divergent policies or of diverging economic fortunes. The answer is 
probably both: inside a monetary union, diverging economic fortunes will 
lead to diverging economic paths, especially if policy responses diverge. Our 
analysis has suggested that countries that have learned to live with a hard 48 | 7
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currency in the past are able to adjust within EMU. This applies primarily to 
some of the smaller countries, but also to some extent to Germany, which has 
regained competitiveness through rigorous price and cost control.  
In countries with a tradition of price stability, it was generally the central 
bank that educated economic players in these countries, based on a broader 
public consensus, to operate in a hard currency environment. See Box 4.1 for 
the few examples one can cite from recent economic history in Europe. 
Box 4.1 A lesson from the history of European integration 
The first attempt to form a monetary union in Europe started in the early 
1970s. (the so-called ‘Werner Plan’ to reach EMU by 1980). It ended in total 
failure because of intra-area differences which show, mutatis mutandis, very 
similar elements to today’s situation.  
At the time, the main reason for divergence was a difference in the reaction to 
the oil shock of 1973. Germany chose the hard-currency approach, whereas 
most other countries tried to inflate their way out. Needless to say, the attempt 
to inflate away a terms-of-trade loss was not successful. The hard currency 
model thus led over time to much better economic performance. Monetary 
union became possible only once this lesson had been learnt and, at least on 
the surface, there was broad agreement on the hard-currency approach. 
The list of countries that has absolved successfully a national stress test of the 
hard-currency approach is not long: 
•  Germany after 1967, following the rise of the DM against the dollar and 
again in 1973; 
•  The Netherlands following break-up of the Bretton-Woods system in 
1974, in the ‘snake’ with the DM; 
•  Austria in the early 1980s, after adoption of the hard-shilling policy; and 
•  France in the early 1990s, following adoption of the franc fort policy in 
the late 1980s. 
By contrast, none of the Southern European countries has maintained a hard-
currency policy over an entire business cycle. 
Today the main threat no longer comes from trade unions that demand 
double-digit wage increases. Rather, the main danger lies in the swelling ranks 
of retirees who demand ‘only’ their acquired rights in the face of shrinking 
resources. As we have documented several times, the resources available for 
distribution have shrunk due to lower productivity growth and ongoing 
demographic decline. Today, as 30 years ago, policy-makers at first are trying 
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Acceptance of the long-term constraints on fiscal policy is made more 
difficult by the fact that financial markets can provide immediate signals as 
long as there is a national currency to sell. Countries like Italy (and France at 
some point) learned from experience that bad fiscal policy led immediately to 
large pressures on the currency and interest rates. Under EMU, the long-term 
constraints appear now in the form of man-made rules, like the Stability Pact, 
which is increasingly perceived as an unwarranted intrusion of the EU into 
national policy-making. In the 1970s the ‘gnomes from Zürich’ were the 
favourite bogeymen for the left wing Italian press. Today, the ‘accountants 
from Brussels’ have a similar image.  
 
In EMU, it is the ECB’s task to perform this job for those countries that have 
not had this education. This means that the ECB will have to downgrade its 
short-term concern about cyclical economic developments and pursue a 
monetary policy with a view to hardening the euro in the long-term. It also 
means that the hard currency countries will have to return to fiscal discipline, 
setting an example and exerting pressure on the previous soft currency 
countries to do the same. The importance of this point cannot be exaggerated: 
if the hard currency countries – Germany and France – want to preserve a 
strong currency, they need to lead by example and credibly adjust their fiscal 
stances as soon as it is feasible, in order to have a comfortable position by the 
beginning of the next downturn. Only if France and Germany can correct 
their, at present only moderately ‘excessive’, deficits will they have the 
necessary moral and political authority to prevent much more serious 
excesses in Italy and other countries under stress. 
The ECB will not be able to keep the euro hard if it lacks political support. 
But it has no natural political constituency it can appeal to over the heads of 
politicians for a stability-oriented monetary policy. Hence, EMU can only 
survive as a hard-currency union if: 
1)  ECB policy-makers muster the courage to pursue a monetary policy 
that may become very unpopular in the short-run, and 
2)  the governments of previous hard-currency countries support the ECB 
in this endeavour. 
If these conditions are not fulfilled, we fear that the euro will descend into a 
soft currency.  
The ‘lira-isation’ of the euro can no longer be excluded. The ‘euro-isation’ of 
Italy is also possible, and by far a more desirable scenario; but it will require 
a strong commitment by the ECB, and all EU institutions in general, to force 
through the painful but necessary adjustments in Italy and elsewhere. | 50 
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Annex 
Growth in Labour Productivity in Europe: 
Recent Developments 
by 
Francesco Daveri 
1.  Recent developments in labour productivity and hours 
worked in Europe and the US 
Since the inception of the Internet age (dating roughly around 1995), 
1 the 
slowdown in productivity growth in Europe has become an issue of serious 
concern for European policy-makers.  
As shown in Figure A1, irrespective of whether the euro area or a different 
EU aggregate is considered,
2 the growth rate of GDP per hour worked in 
Europe has declined from about 3.5% in the 1970s to 2.4% in the 1980s 
through 1995 and to 1.4% in 1995-2003, in turn bottoming out at less than 
1% in 2000-03. The question is whether this heralds an even bleaker scenario 
of zero productivity growth around 2010 – quite far apart from the policy 
goals asserted in Lisbon in 2000. 
One might go further and state that the gap between the asserted goals for 
productivity (a sub-heading of the ‘Lisbon strategy’) and the actual 
achievements of the European Union along the Lisbon route becomes more 
apparent as time goes by. 
                                                        
1 Although the Internet protocol was signed at the end of 1991, the productivity 
counterpart of its gradual diffusion in the economy can hardly be envisaged as 
instantaneous. For sure, starting in 1995, labour productivity growth took off in 
the US and has never fallen since. Given the prominent lead firmly held by the 
US in the introduction of IT, this implicitly sets an initial date for best-practice 
countries. For slow-adopting economies, such as the Mediterranean countries in 
the EU, it is perhaps more appropriate to think of the end of the 1990s as the 
initial date to search for an impact of IT adoption on productivity. 
2 The EU aggregate used in Figure A1 refers to the 11 EU countries for which 
the ‘total hours worked’ series is computed by the OECD and provided in the 
OECD Productivity Database. EMU AT RISK | 53 
 
Figure A1. GDP per hour worked, US vs. EU11 
(EU11=EU15 - Aut, Gre, Lux, Por) 
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Such a continued productivity slowdown might be interpreted as the smooth 
and somehow unavoidable continuation of the convergence process initiated 
after the end of World War II. The sharing of advanced US technologies 
produced high growth for a few years (and possibly decades) in the 
comparatively poorer, but opportunity-rich European countries. This process 
took place in parallel with extensive resource reallocation away from low-
productivity agriculture into high-productivity manufacturing industries. As 
productivity and income converged towards US levels, however, the scope 
for further exploitation of this channel of ‘imported growth’ narrowed. This – 
somehow fatalistic – view has been modelled in Acemoglu, Aghion & 
Zilibotti (2002) and is well documented in Blanchard (2004). 
Taking a look at the data from the US may suggest a slightly different 
perspective. Productivity trends in the US in fact show a smooth acceleration 
throughout recent years, irrespective of whether the economy was in a 
recession or in a favourable cyclical contingency. During the so-called 
‘productivity slowdown’ years, labour productivity in the US economy 
disappointingly grew by 1.6% in the 1970s, 1.4% in the 1980s and 1.2% in 
1990-95. But then something happened around 1995. Since then, throughout 
the 1995-2003 years, productivity per hour worked has steadily grown by 
2.2% per year, trending up to a whopping 2.8% in 2000-03. It is particularly 
noteworthy that labour productivity unconventionally grew by 1.9% even in 
2001 – the year of the terrorist attacks and the bursting of the bubble and also 
a time when US GDP growth was nil. 54 | 7
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Has this picture changed in 2004? Data for productivity per man hour for 
2004 from the OECD Productivity Database are not yet available, but the 
OECD Economic Outlook data set provides preliminary 2004 figures as to 
the value added per employed person in the business sector and the average 
hours worked by employees. In 2004, the value added per employed person 
in the business sector has grown by 1.2% in the euro area, while the average 
number of hours worked kept declining for most EU countries, but at a 
somewhat slower pace than in the early 2000s (-0.2% in 2004, as opposed to 
-0.4% in 1995-2003). 
Table A1. Labour productivity growth over time and across European 
countries, the US, the G-7 (growth rates, % points) 
 1980-95  1995-2004  1995-2003  2001-04 
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
 
GDP per 
employed 
person 
(business 
sector) 
GDP per 
employed 
person 
(business 
sector) 
GDP per 
hour worked 
(whole 
economy) 
GDP per 
employed 
person 
(business 
sector) 
Euro area  1.8  0.9  1.5  0.6 
Germany 1.7 0.9  1.6 0.7 
France 2.2  1.3  2.0  1.0 
Italy 2.1  0.5  0.5  -0.2 
Spain 2.1  0.8  0.7  0.7 
Austria 2.4  2.0  1.6  1.1 
Belgium 1.9  1.4  1.2  1.1 
Finland 3.4  2.3  2.3  1.9 
Greece 0.1  3.5  3.1  3.8 
Ireland 3.8  4.0  5.0  3.4 
Luxembourg 1.3  1.5  1.8  -0.5 
Netherlands 1.2  0.9  0.5  0.4 
Portugal 2.0  1.3  2.1  0.0 
        
UK 2.3  1.8  2.2  1.8 
Denmark 1.6 2.1  1.3 1.9 
Sweden 2.6  2.4  2.3  2.1 
        
Czech Rep  NA  2.6  3.1  2.8 
Hungary -2.4  3.6  2.8 3.2 
Poland NA  5.8  NA  4.9 
Slovakia -2.7  3.9  5.2 3.3 
        
US 1.4  2.6  2.2  2.9 
G-7 1.7  1.9    2.1 
Sources: OECD Productivity Database (column [3]) and OECD Economic Outlook, 
December 2004 (other columns). EMU AT RISK | 55 
 
As implied by the numbers in Table A1, a 1.2% growth rate of GDP per 
employed person is higher than in 2001-03 (when it was close to a bare 
annual 0.4%) and higher than in 2003. All in all, in 2004, the growth rate of 
value added per man hour in the euro area appears to have reached some 
+1.3% in the economy as a whole (and possibly a handful of decimals more 
in the business sector only). This does not make Europe a big Ireland or a 
South Korea (especially if one considers that this increase also reflects the 
usual pro-cyclicality of labour productivity),
3   but it is clearly a more 
respectable growth rate of labour productivity than experienced in the recent 
past. It is too soon, however, to infer whether the past downward trend is 
being reversed. 
Finally, Figure A2 completes the picture by providing information about the 
growth rates of the labour input, the number of total hours worked, whose 
correlation with labour productivity at the country level will be more 
extensively discussed in the next sections. Figure A2 manifestly shows that 
Europe’s problem in the past was the insufficient creation of jobs. The 
number of total hours worked in the EU economies declined by some 0.7% 
per year in the 1970s and by a more modest 0.2% in 1980-95. Compounding 
implies that, having set the number of total hours worked in Europe to 100 in 
1970, this was down to about 91 as of 1995 – a sheer cumulative labour input 
loss of about 9%. In turn, this is particularly striking in the light of the 
parallel cumulative rise of about 19% in working-age population over the 
same period of time. As is also apparent from Figure A2, job creation was 
astonishingly high in the US economy during the same period. The fast and 
continued increase in employment creation made the total number of hours 
worked increase by more than 1.5% per year for 25 years – a cumulative 
                                                        
3   How to compute the extent of pro-cyclicality of labour productivity is 
contentious. A simple time series regression of the growth rate of value added 
per employed person over its once-lagged value and the growth rate of nominal 
GDP (a measure of cyclical fluctuations), plus a constant term over 1971-2003 
gives an estimated coefficient for nominal GDP growth of about 0.16 (with an 
estimated standard error of 0.04). Hence, if one considers that the 2004 
acceleration of nominal GDP growth in the euro area has reached 1.1 percentage 
points (up to 3.7% in 2004, from 2.6% in 2003), this gives a cyclical correction 
of as much as 0.15-0.25 percentage points (including standard errors). This much 
may be subtracted from the actual growth rate of business labour productivity in 
2004 (1.2 percentage points). Moreover, if we consider that 2003 was a 
particularly bad year for GDP growth, this leads to a slightly upward revision of 
the measured growth rate of labour productivity in 2003. In a nutshell, netting 
out the business cycle would leave the euro area with definitely lower ‘true’ 
productivity acceleration in 2004. 56 | 7
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increase in the labour input of about 45%, just large enough to keep up with 
the (fast) pace of US demographics. 
Figure A2. Total hours worked, US vs. EU11 
(EU11=EU15 - Aut, Gre, Lux, Por) 
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Yet, once again, something then changed. After 1995, the growth rates of 
total hours in the EU and the US became much closer (almost equalling each 
other at about three-quarters of a percentage point per year). It is likely that 
this clear turnaround compared to previous decades is the result of the 
ongoing process of labour market reform in Europe, which – although half-
hearted and piecemeal – has indeed succeeded in raising European 
employment rates closer to the ambitious goal of 70%, as stated in Lisbon. 
2.  Productivity and hour growth across European 
countries 
2.1  TFP vs. capital deepening 
Having summarised the broad picture for the EU as a whole, it is also 
instructive to contrast productivity growth rates across the EU countries in 
1995-2003, based on the data from the OECD Productivity Database. The 
country-specific productivity data, shown in Table A1 (columns [2] and [3]), EMU AT RISK | 57 
 
exhibit quite a bit of variability within the enlarged EU
4 and within the group 
of the big EU countries as well. 
At the country level, data are available for both labour productivity and total 
(or multi-) factor productivity (TFP). It is useful to keep track of both. 
Labour productivity is tightly linked to living standards and real wages, but it 
is an imperfect measure of efficiency. TFP changes, computed as a residual 
after netting out the contribution of the accumulation of capital per hour 
worked to labour productivity growth, are instead meant to capture changes 
in the efficient use of all the factors of production taken as a whole, brought 
about by reorganization and other major changes in the modes of 
production.
5 Both pieces of information are used here. 
As to labour productivity, although the big picture is still one of a declining 
productivity performance of Europe over time, the data also indicate that not 
all of the EU countries are equally plagued by low productivity growth. To 
name two big ones, the growth rate of value added per hour in the UK and 
France was not too far behind that of the US in 1995-2003, hovering around 
2% per year. The same applies to Finland and Sweden. The Nordic countries 
have witnessed a slight decline in their productivity performance compared 
to previous years, but, overall, productivity growth in these countries remains 
remarkably high and steady over time. By contrast, Italy, Spain and the 
Netherlands are countries where the productivity of labour grew the least, 
with compounded average growth rates of about one-half of a percentage 
point per year or so over the last few years.
6 
Germany is in between, with an average growth rate of about 1.6% per year 
in 1995-2003, declining below 1% in the early 2000s. As reported in 
columns (2) and (3), the discrepancy between the growth rate of GDP per 
worker and per hour worked is particularly pronounced for this country. This 
is the counterpart of the particularly fast decline in the number of average 
                                                        
4 The OECD Productivity Database provides data for 18 EU countries, including 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, over 1995-2003. 
5 In a nutshell, ‘productivity’ should thus be measured by TFP. The computation 
of TFP requires, however, the untested assumptions of perfect competition in the 
factor and product markets and constant returns to scale, both of which greatly 
reduce its informational content and appeal. 
6  Cette (2004) appropriately points out that an artificial reduction in labour 
productivity may obtain if a country is changing its recording procedure of 
previously unrecorded jobs on the output side but not on the employment side. 
This may have been the case of Spain and the Netherlands – which have both 
been subject to rapid labour market reform over the late 1990s. This is likely to 
be a level, rather than a growth effect, however. 58 | 7
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hours worked that plagues the German economy even more so than the rest 
of the EU economies (see Blanchard, 2004). Some of the recent union 
agreements to work longer hours have apparently not ended this trend. 
Much higher productivity growth (in excess of three percentage points per 
year) is seen instead in the poorer European countries, first of all Ireland (the 
brightest European success story of the 1990s), the small Mediterranean ones 
(Greece and Portugal) and the Eastern European countries, such as the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. In these countries, productivity growth is 
also prominently fed by the substantial reallocation from agriculture and old 
manufacturing industries into new manufacturing industries (although the 
scope of such reallocation may be rather constrained, as emphasised by 
Caselli & Tenreyro, 2005). 
One might also argue that small countries tend to fare better than large 
countries. It remains still unclear, however, whether this positive ‘small 
country’ effect would actually survive once the convergence effect brought 
about by the presence of many low per-capita GDP countries in the group of 
small countries is controlled for. 
Finally, as is apparent in comparing when the data in column (4) of Table A1 
with the data in column (2), productivity growth has usually declined over 
time in all countries except Greece in 2001-04, with a low in 2001-03 and an 
upward rebound in 2004. 
Table A2 (column [1]-[3]) and Figure A3 enrich the picture by presenting 
data for a slightly shorter time period (1995-2002 or 1995-2001, when 2002 
data are unavailable) for the growth of value added per man hour (one more 
time), this time decomposed into its TFP and capital deepening component. 
As indicated there, TFP growth is tightly correlated with labour productivity 
growth. A simple cross-sectional regression of labour productivity growth on 
a constant and TFP growth (using the available 14 observations) gives a very 
close fit with the highly significant coefficient for TFP close to 0.90 
(standard errors in parentheses): 
GrowthGDP per hour worked =  .94  +  .89 GrowthTFP  Adj. R-squared = .80 
 (.20)  (.12)   
This is like saying that the poor labour productivity performance of Italy and 
Spain finds a close counterpart in very low (even negative, in the case of 
Spain) growth rates of TFP. If it were not for capital deepening, Italy and 
Spain would have experienced zero or negative growth of labour EMU AT RISK | 59 
 
productivity.
7   By the same token, the outstanding labour productivity 
increase in Ireland is largely accounted for by TFP growth. TFP also makes 
more than 50% of the growth rate of labour productivity in Belgium, France, 
Greece and Portugal and reaches 100% of the labour productivity increase in 
Finland. 
Table A2. Decomposing labour productivity growth into TFP and capital 
deepening components in European countries and the US (growth 
rates, % points) 
 1995-2002  1985-95 
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
 
GDP 
per hour 
worked 
Capital 
deepening TFP 
GDP 
per hour 
worked 
Capital 
deepening TFP 
Germany 1.7  0.9  0.8  NA  NA  NA 
France 2.2  0.8  1.4  2.3  1.0  1.3 
Italy
* 0.9  0.8  0.1  2.1  0.6  1.5 
Spain
* 0.5  1.2  -0.7  1.6  1.0  0.6 
Austria 1.6  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Belgium
* 1.1  0.5  0.6  2.3  1.4  0.9 
Finland
* 2.3  0.0  2.3  3.1  1.4  1.7 
Greece
* 3.1  1.3  1.8  0.8  0.7  0.1 
Ireland
* 5.0  0.6  4.4  3.6  0.3  3.3 
Luxembourg 1.8  NA  NA  2.9  NA  NA 
Netherlands 0.5  -0.4 0.9  1.5  0.8 0.7 
Portugal
* 2.6  1.1  1.5  NA  NA  NA 
            
UK
* 2.4  1.5  0.9  2.0  1.1  0.9 
Denmark
* 1.1 1.0  0.1  1.6  1.1  0.5 
Sweden
* 2.1  1.3  0.8  1.6  1.2  0.4 
            
US 2.1  0.8  1.3  1.2  0.4  0.8 
* Data refer to 1995-2001. 
Source: OECD Productivity Database, February 2005. 
                                                        
7 The TFP growth collapse in these two countries is a novel feature: the 1985-95 
decomposition also reported in Table A2 (columns 4-6) in fact presents a more 
balanced splitting between the two components of labour productivity growth. 60 | 7
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Figure A3. TFP and labour productivity growth 
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The regression does a particularly good job correctly predicting the actual 
values of labour productivity growth for France and the US, the two 
countries often taken to represent outright different modes of production (see 
e.g. Caselli & Tenreyro, 2005). This is not surprising, given that the 
underlying productivity data for these two countries are essentially the same: 
same growth rates of labour productivity and TFP and the same contributions 
of capital to growth. (The differences in labour market outcomes will be 
described in the next section.) 
Regression residuals clearly exist on both sides. The UK and Swedish labour 
productivity performances are consistently better than their values predicted 
by the regression (respectively, 2.4 and 2.1 percentage points instead of 1.7 
and 1.6). The Netherlands seems to ‘waste’ (so to speak) its rather high TFP 
growth through a recorded negative contribution of capital (per hour worked) 
to labour productivity growth. This may be seen as the other side of the coin 
of exceptionally good labour market outcomes, which have likely brought 
about a decline in the capital-labour ratio adopted by Dutch companies. 
Finland is another data point below the regression line. Capital deepening 
has been very low in Finland as well, although for a different reason: the 
return to fast productivity growth in the Finnish economy in the 1990s has 
taken place through an extensive process of ‘old capital’ shedding.
8 
                                                        
8 The role of capital shedding in Finland has been investigated, among others, by 
Jalava & Pohjola (2005) with aggregate data, by Daveri & Silva (2004) with 
industry data and by Maliranta (2001) and Maliranta & Rouvinen (2004) with 
micro data. EMU AT RISK | 61 
 
Oversimplified as it is (and possibly plagued by variable omission and other 
specification problems), the cross-sectional regression results lead to an old-
fashioned, but also stringent implication: particularly high or particularly low 
labour productivity growth often has a TFP growth counterpart.
9 This is also 
the result of the diminished contribution of capital deepening observed 
throughout many EU countries over the 1990s (not captured by the cross-
sectional regression in the main text, but shown in Table A2) and clearly 
associated with the declining investment shares of GDP observed in many 
European countries. Given that capital deepening has become a less 
important source of growth in the second half of the 1990s, however, this has 
contributed to raise the relative importance of TFP growth as a source of 
labour productivity growth. 
2.2  Growth of productivity vs. growth of hours 
The OECD data on productivity and hours show another stark fact: as 
depicted in Figure A4, there is a negative correlation between the growth of 
labour productivity and the growth of total hours worked. If Ireland is left 
out, the correlation coefficient between the growth rates of labour 
productivity and the number of total hours worked is negative 0.55.  
The fast-growing Eastern European countries are seemingly paying a heavy 
toll in terms of diminished employment creation. The same applies to Greece 
and Portugal, where high growth rates of productivity are coupled with low 
or negative growth of hours. At the other end of the spectrum, Spain, the 
Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Italy exhibit low productivity growth and 
fast growth of total hours worked. 
Altogether, this may be taken to imply that, except for Ireland where both 
high productivity and growth in hours worked are observed, labour demand 
does not seemingly shift enough to the right in the rest of Europe. In other 
words, the rise in employment rates experienced in European countries in the 
last few years has probably been mostly labour-supply driven. This is 
consistent with a microeconomics textbook view that locates most EU 
countries along a given labour demand curve depending on their labour 
supply conditions. 
According to this – simplified but possibly useful – partial equilibrium view 
of the labour market, it is no wonder that Germany presents both lower 
growth of labour productivity and lower growth of hours than the US. This is 
because of its lower TFP growth (+0.8% per year against +1.3% in the US). 
                                                        
9 An extensive discussion of the role of capital deepening in the EU productivity 
slowdown of the 1990s can be found in Daveri (2004). 62 | 7
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By the same token, if one compares pairs of countries with similar TFP 
growth rates, one would expect to observe a negative relationship between 
growth of labour productivity and hours. This is the case for Greece and 
Finland, for example. They share roughly similar TFP growth rates (close to 
2% per year) and indeed Greece exhibits higher growth of labour 
productivity and lower growth of hours worked than Finland. 
Figure A4. Growth in productivity and hours worked, 1995-2003 
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2.3  Summing up on labour productivity and hours growth 
Going beyond the aggregate picture of the euro area, it is helpful to highlight 
that speaking of a ‘euro area productivity performance’ may miss some 
important details to be captured by looking at the country-specific 
productivity and hour growth performances. This is important to point out, 
especially in the light of the recent 2004 productivity acceleration. The 
variability of productivity performances in 1995-2003 gives another reason 
to be cautious before turning the improved 2004 figures into an optimistic 
scenario of high productivity growth for the euro area in the future. 
3.  Is there a positive contribution of industry reallocation 
to labour productivity growth? 
As more extensively detailed, e.g. in OECD (2001) and Daveri (2003), the 
aggregate changes in productivity levels can be decomposed in the 
contributions of their industry components. Each industry is in turn the sum 
of within- and between-components. EMU AT RISK | 63 
 
Any given industry may, in fact, contribute to aggregate productivity growth 
in two ways.
10 Suppose first that the level of labour productivity in industry j 
is the same as the economy-wide average. Then aggregate labour 
productivity growth is simply the weighted average of each industry’s 
productivity growth, with the industry’s fixed weights equal to the nominal 
value added shares in some base (usually initial) year. In this economy, the 
higher the growth rate of productivity in each individual industry, the higher 
the growth rate of productivity in the aggregate. Moreover, resource 
reallocation across industries would not affect the growth rate of labour 
productivity. 
If, as is very likely, productivity differs across industries, then resource 
reallocation across industries (but not across firms within industries) also has 
an impact on aggregate productivity, holding other things constant. This 
reallocation (or between) effect may positively contribute to aggregate 
growth if industry j is expanding (respectively, contracting) employment and 
its level (or growth) of labour productivity is higher (respectively, lower) 
than the economy-wide average. Hence, if labour moves to industries that are 
less productive (or growing at a slower pace) than the average, the 
reallocation effect may well be negative. 
The contribution of industry j to aggregate productivity growth is 
approximated as the sum of these two effects. This is done in Table A3 for 
non-durable and durable manufacturing as well as for private services, 
starting from a 30-industry decomposition obtained from STAN.
11 The 
results of this decomposition for the US, Germany, France, the UK and Italy 
(hence, the big EU-4) in 1995-2000 are reported in Table A3. 
                                                        
10  As detailed in Nordhaus (2002), a fully-fledged decomposition would also 
include the so-called ‘Baumol effect’. The Baumol effect originates from 
changing value added shares in industries growing at different rates. 
11 The disaggregation of manufacturing industries in non-durable and durable 
producers is standard. Non-durable producing industries are those industries 
producing either consumer or intermediate goods, while durable producers 
produce machinery and equipment and means of transportation. As 
recommended by the OECD, ‘private services’ is computed excluding ‘Real 
estate activities’ (ISIC 70) and ‘Community, personal and social services’ (ISIC 
75-99) from ‘Total services’ (ISIC 50-99). 64 | 7
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Table A3. Decomposing aggregate labour productivity growth in pure and 
reallocation industry effects, US and the big EU-4 (1995-2000) 
 US  UK  France  Germany  Italy 
Non-agriculture business 
sector 
       
Productivity growth (1)  3.63  2.02  1.55  1.86  0.86 
Pure productivity (2)  3.54  1.59  1.61  1.37  0.71 
Reallocation (3)  -0.09  0.25  -0.02  0.48  0.21 
Non-durable manufacturing         
Pure productivity (4)  0.10  0.07  0.42  0.38  0.10 
Reallocation (5)  0.01  0.05  0.01  0.03  -0.01 
Durable manufacturing         
Pure productivity (6)  1.00  0.26  0.66  0.19  0.17 
Reallocation (7)  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.01  -0.01 
Private services         
Pure productivity (8)  2.44  1.26  0.53  0.80  0.44 
Reallocation (9)  -0.09  0.22  -0.03  0.44  0.23 
Source: Primary data from OECD STAN. 
Notes: Labour productivity growth is the growth rate of GDP per employed person. 
Totals in column (1) may not add up due to the residual component (see 
footnote 7 in the main text). For brevity, other industries (mining, 
construction, public utilities) are left out of the table. 
 
There are two main observations to be drawn from Table A3. First, the pure 
productivity effect – also known as the ‘within effect’ – accounts for the bulk 
of labour productivity increases in all countries. 
The near totality of the 3.5% growth of labour productivity in the US 
economy is accounted for by within effects. About two-thirds of this effect 
originate from market services – known to be ‘IT-using’ industries from 
Stiroh (2002) – and the remaining one-third from durable manufacturing, 
whose contribution to the US productivity revival has been documented by 
Gordon (2000, 2003). The within effect also accounts for more than 100% of 
the labour productivity increase in France as well (yet another similarity 
between the US and France!). In France, at odds with the US, however, not 
much of an accelerating productivity has been observed in market services: 
the contribution of market services to productivity growth was about half a 
percentage point (2.5 percentage points in the US). This parallels the results 
(and deeper analysis) in van Ark, Inklaar & McGuckin (2003) and 
O’Mahony & van Ark (2003) for the EU15. 
The second observation from Table A3 is that resource reallocation across 
industries (the ‘between effect’) has been sizable in a few European countries 
(Germany first of all, but also the UK and Italy). This was particularly EMU AT RISK | 65 
 
apparent in the market services industries and has actually positively 
contributed to the growth of labour productivity for about one-half of a 
percentage point per year in Germany and one-quarter of a percentage point 
in the UK and Italy. This is the result of the fact that a large fraction of the 
new jobs created in these countries has been created in business services 
(over and above the many jobs created in real estate). Because such 
industries are more productive than the average industry in the German, 
British and Italian economies, this has boosted labour productivity growth in 
these countries. 
These results require two qualifications, however. First, a high pure 
productivity effect does not mean that resource reallocation has been 
unimportant in the US, but simply that such reallocation has mostly taken 
place across firms within the same industry. This is not visible in the industry 
data presented here. The very high within-industry productivity effect is 
indeed there and has been documented by a substantial body of literature, 
including Davis, Haltiwanger & Schuh (1996) and OECD (2003a, 2003b). 
These studies, however, have shown that a high degree of within-industry 
heterogeneity is present in the US economy as well as an easier scope for 
market experimentation. Altogether, this has implied that the bulk of the 
productivity gains in the US economy has come from the birth of new, more 
productive firms (to which workers have been relentlessly reallocated) rather 
than from the productivity gains achieved by the incumbents.
12 
Second, the positive reallocation effect for Germany and Italy may have 
weakened in the early 2000s, as the two economies witnessed a worsening of 
their productivity slowdown. This is not captured by the decomposition in 
Table A3 which stops in the year 2000. 
4. Conclusions 
Europe has a productivity problem. The unabated productivity performance 
experienced by the US economy in the last few years poses a challenge to 
European policy-makers, entrepreneurs and workers. This challenge can be 
briefly summarised in four words: “It can be done”. 
The question is how. The available evidence indicates that a speeding up of 
productivity growth in Europe will likely be achieved through an 
acceleration of TFP growth rather than through capital deepening. The 
continuation of labour market reform will in fact intensify the process of 
substitution of labour for capital, thereby contributing to the decline in the 
                                                        
12 For a systematic discussion of the relation between regulation and productivity 
growth, see Nicoletti & Scarpetta (2003) 66 | 7
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capital deepening component of labour productivity growth. As to TFP 
growth, for sure, the European productivity problem will not be cured by 
subsidising lagging industries, but rather by enhancing the within and 
between productivity effects discussed in the previous sections, thereby 
easing reallocation within industries as well as easing reallocation across 
industries. This requires further deregulation and true completion of the 
Internal Market. This also requires, as emphasised in the Sapir Report (Sapir 
et al., 2003), that investment in knowledge is boosted by creating an 
independent European Agency for Science and Research, encouraging 
private sector R&D via tax credits and re-focusing the structure of the – slim 
– EU budget away from agriculture into three separate growth, restructuring 
and cohesion funds. The growth fund would be the appropriate pool from 
which to fund supranational R&D, training and educational projects. 
Fortunately, also thanks to the Sapir Report, the importance of raising TFP 
growth is now better understood as a crucial issue for enhancing productivity 
in Europe than it was a few years ago. Yet, it is still insufficiently 
appreciated that is quite difficult to engineer higher TFP growth, for it 
requires, to name just a few things, higher and more efficient R&D spending 
as well as courageous reform of university and scientific incentive systems 
across the board. All of these things are intended to be done, but, as 
emphasised by Baily & Kirkegard (2004), they are slow to be approved by 
national Parliaments and to be fully implemented. Hence, unlike in the past, 
the biggest obstacle to the adoption of productivity-enhancing policies in 
Europe today lies more in the impatience and disillusionment of European 
citizens than in a lack of goodwill on the part of policy-makers. | 67 
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